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Abstract
In this dissertation, I explore peer effects and social networks among MBA students in a
Canadian business school. The unique feature of the data collected for this research is that the
students are administratively assigned to small groups, providing plausibly exogenous varia-
tion that allows me to identify causal peer effects. Chapter 1, “Peer Effects in an MBA class”,
establishes the existence and magnitude of the effects of peer characteristics on academic out-
comes of MBA students. It also shows that peer effects are heterogeneous across courses and
student characteristics. Chapter 2, “Testing team allocation rules”, takes the findings of the
first chapter and uses them to find the allocations of students across teams that result in highest
grades for the Managerial Finance course. After testing ten different allocation rules, I find
that separating students by their admission GPA (a proxy for academic ability) may result in
the best grades in Managerial Finance class. I discuss the role of the business school and posit
that academic achievement may not be the only outcome that is important for business school
graduates. Finally, in Chapter 3, “Comparison of the Two Methods of Social Network Data
Collection”, I compare two methods of social network data collection. A recollection method
asks respondents to name a certain number of friends; while a recognition method asks respon-
dents to pick peers from a provided list. First, I present descriptive results of the data collected
by these two methods. Then I use the approach described in Comola and Fafchamps (2017)
to estimate the true proportion of links by using the information from the discordant answers.
I conclude by commenting on the appropriate uses of the two methods of social network data
collection.
Keywords: Peer effects, social networks, methodology, education
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Summary for Lay Audience
In this dissertation, I explore peer effects and social networks among MBA students in a
Canadian business school. Peer effects describe the potential influence student’s friends or
classmates may have on their educational or social outcomes. The unique feature of the data
collected for this research is that the students are administratively assigned to small groups,
which allows me to avoid a common problem of students selecting their own peer groups.
Chapter 1, “Peer Effects in an MBA class”, establishes the existence and magnitude of the
effects of peer characteristics on academic outcomes of MBA students. It shows that compo-
sition of student teams matters in some classes. It also shows that various types of students
are influenced by their peers in different ways. Chapter 2, “Testing team allocation rules”, uses
these results to find the allocations of students across groups that produce the highest grades for
the Managerial Finance course. I find that separating students by their admission GPA (a proxy
for academic ability) may result in the best grades in Managerial Finance class. I discuss the
role of the business school and posit that academic achievement may not be the only outcome
that is important for business school graduates. Finally, in Chapter 3, “Comparison of the Two
Methods of Social Network Data Collection”, I compare two methods of social network data
collection: a recollection method, where we ask respondents to name their friends, and a recog-
nition method, where we ask them to pick friends from a given list. First, I present descriptive
results of the data collected by these two methods. Then I use the approach described in Co-
mola and Fafchamps (2017) to estimate the true proportion of links by using the information
from the data where respondents disagree on whether or not they are connected. I conclude by
commenting on the appropriate uses of the two methods of social network data collection.
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Introduction
Peers play an important role in any educational process. From kindergarten to graduate school,
students who interact with each other on a daily basis may affect each other’s social, personal
and educational outcomes. The study of peer effects is complicated by the fact that in many
cases students pick their groups of peers themselves, thus creating an endogeneity problem.
Despite the growing body of research on this topic, there is still a debate on the importance
of peer effects and their effect on different students. My dissertation contributes to the fields
of economic of education and study of social networks, by providing evidence of existence
of peer effect among students, establishing the best rules of allocating students across teams,
comparing different ways of social network data collection and investigating the methods of
estimation of the true social network size. It consists of three essays, related by the topic of
peer effects and social networks.
Using unique data I collected at a leading Canadian MBA program, I conduct an analysis of
peer effects in small, administratively assigned groups called learning teams. There are several
features of my data that I am able to exploit that differentiate this thesis from previous literature.
First, I benefit from the exogenous, stratified random assignment of students into small teams.
This plausibly exogenous variation allows me to identify causal peer effects. Second, I obtained
a rich administrative dataset consisting of a number of students’ demographic characteristics
as well as their academic outcomes. Finally, I designed and administered a survey among three
cohorts of MBA students and evaluated their study habits, preferences, non-cognitive charac-
teristics (the Big Five personality traits) and social networks. I use the grade in Managerial
Finance class as the main outcome. This class is a mandatory core course that is taken in the
first semester upon entering the program. It is one of the more quantitatively heavy courses
and does not contain any explicit group project, allowing me to see a clearer picture of how
peers affect individual outcomes, without worrying about potential “free-rider” problems that
are common if the same grade is given to all members of a team. Grades in this class are also
often requested by potential employers as a part of an application package, making students
especially motivated to perform well. I was able to acquire grades from another course, called
Leading People in Organizations for two years. This course is more qualitative, and focuses on
1
2
developing students’ soft skills.1
In Chapter 1, “Peer effects in an MBA program”, I establish the existence of peer effects
among the members of the same learning teams. I show that peer effects exist and are signif-
icant. First of all, I find that a high proportion of peers with STEM degrees has a statistically
significant negative effect on student’s grade. For illustration, substituting one commerce peer
for a STEM peer in a learning team could decrease a student’s grade for the written component
of Finance class by approximately 1%. Second, there is some evidence that students assigned
to teams with low GPA peers perform better in the finance course. Because of the nature of my
dataset, I am able to explore heterogeneities in peer effects, in particular, how different types of
students are affected by their peers. I find that peer effects are heterogeneous across students of
different ability levels (as measured by their admission GPA). Academically weaker students
benefit from having a high fraction of low admission GPA peers in their group, while stronger
students have higher grades if they are in a team with peers in the top of the admission GPA
distribution. Meanwhile, a high proportion of top GMAT peers has a negative effect on the
grades of students with similarly high GMAT scores. Heterogeneous peer effects indicate that
there may be a Pareto improving way of allocating students across teams. After analysing the
survey data, including the Big 5 personality characteristics of different students, I posit that
peers with top GMAT scores may be most likely to be critical and inflexible, thus creating
a suboptimal study atmosphere in the group. While they may encourage their teammates to
spend time studying with the team, this study time does not appear to be effective and does not
help students achieve better grades. Similarly, students with STEM background like to engage
in arguments over the case points. While in moderation this behaviour may be good for study
process, having many team members who enjoy arguing may create a hostile environment.
Given that students of similar ability levels (as measured by undergraduate GPA) perform bet-
ter if they are placed in the same groups, I conclude that having a positive atmosphere during
study meeting where students are comfortable discussing their ideas and ask questions may be
the key to the good performance in the course.
In Chapter 1 I also address one of the potential issues with some of the research on peer
effects in education. Many of the papers on the subject use cumulative GPA or some other
average grade as an outcome. To illustrate the difference between peer effects on average vs.
individual course outcomes, I use the grades for Managerial Finance class and supplement
this data with the grades in a qualitative, group project-based course called Leading People in
Organizations. These two courses are quite different, both in terms of the content and in terms
of evaluations, allowing me to approximate a student’s average grade in a program. There is no
1Because of a different structure of the course and limited availability of grades data I use these grades as a
secondary outcome to illustrate that peer effects may be heterogeneous across different classes.
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reason to believe that peers will have the same effects on different courses since they require
different skills and knowledge, and I show that focusing on the average grade may lead to false
conclusions about the absence of peer effects. This is a simple observation, but an important
point to consider in any research that finds lack of peer effects when looking at an average
grade as an outcome.
The natural next step of peer effects investigation is to see whether there are any team allo-
cation rules that could potentially improve the learning process and outcomes for the students.
Using the findings from the first chapter, I test several rules for team allocations informed by
the previous research or existing program rules. I find that division of students by admission
GPA category results in the highest improvement of the average grade and none of the groups of
students experience drops in their projected grades. This research is subject to several caveats.
First, dividing students into homogenous groups may be perceived as unfair, especially if the
division is done by previous academic achievements. Second, the purpose of the business
school may not be to only maximise students’ academic achievements, but also to expose them
to different peers. According to several business school websites, this provides students with
the experience of dealing with different types of people, including improving their cultural in-
telligence, which is crucial in the modern diverse workforce environment. The counterpoint to
this is that often potential employers request the grades in key courses as a part of application
package. Thus, it is in students’ best interests to achieve the best grade and best academic
outcome as possible. The third caveat, is that the grades in the business programs are often
“bell-curved”, and the grades are brought to the same mean every year. Thus, even with the
different group assignment, we may not observe a change in mean grades. However, assuming
that the grades reflect the level of knowledge acquired by students, the simulation exercise then
shows that students will benefit from improved subject knowledge, even if it does not come
through as an increase of final grades.
The third chapter of this thesis, “Comparison of the Two Methods of Social Network Data
Collection”, directly compares the recognition and recollection methods of collecting the so-
cial network data. Often, when investigating peer effects and, in general, social networks,
researchers collect data on the networks using surveys. There are two main ways of acquiring
the social network information: recollection or recognition questions. In a recollection ques-
tion, respondents are asked to name a set number of their friends or peers. In a recognition
question, respondents are presented with a list of potential peers, and they are asked to pick the
names from the list. Aside from the constraints on the completion time or availability of a suit-
able peer list requirements, it is not clear whether one method is better than the other in terms
of obtaining an accurate measure of the network. In the survey I ran among the MBA student
I included both types of the questions, which allows me to compare and contrast the resulting
4
networks. Using a method adapted from Comola and Fafchamps (2017), where I explicitly
model misreporting probabilities, I am able to estimate that size of the actual network (since
either of the questions is likely to capture only a part of connections). To estimate the model I
make two assumptions. First, I assume that students only report the links that are indeed there
and second, I assume that link reports are independent across the respondents. I find that under
the assumption of underreporting the size of the network may represent only two thirds of the
size of an actual network. I conclude that there are several crucial differences in the results
of the two questions. While neither method is error-free, there are some considerations a re-
searcher may take into account when deciding on a question to ask. I also discuss some simple
validation options that may be included in the survey.
Chapter 1
Peer Effects in an MBA Program
1.1 Introduction
Peers play an important role in any educational process. In the setting of an MBA program
peers may be helpful or disruptive, they may explain certain concepts better than an instructor
or provide personal experiences that make a subject more interesting or understandable. They
may make studying for tests easy, or they may needlessly complicate it by creating conflict.
Understanding the process of students affecting each other through interactions in class or
during small study team meetings is the first step to figuring out a better way of allocating
students across sections, tutorials, or any other groups. Despite the growing body of literature
on the peer effects in education, there is still a lack of consensus on the importance of peer
effects on academic outcomes. Most of the traditional models of peer effects focus on cognitive
peer characteristics or peer behaviour. To my knowledge, none of the research in the economics
of education has incorporated the personality characteristics of student’s peers when looking at
possible mechanisms behind the peer effects. Very few researchers also have an opportunity to
ask students directly about their behaviour and roles when interacting with their peers.
Using unique data I collected at a leading Canadian MBA program, I analyze peer effects in
small, administratively assigned groups called learning teams. There are several features of my
data that I can exploit and that differentiate this paper from previous literature. First, I benefit
from the exogenous, stratified random assignment of students into small teams. This provides
me with the plausibly exogenous variation that helps me identify causal peer effects. Second, I
obtained a rich administrative dataset consisting of students’ demographic characteristics and
their academic outcomes. Finally, I designed and administered a survey among three cohorts
of MBA students and evaluated their study habits, preferences and non-cognitive characteris-
tics (the Big Five personality traits). Having this information allows me to look for possible
explanations for the peer effects I find in the data. I use the grade in Managerial Finance class
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as the primary outcome. This class is a mandatory core course that is taken in the first semester
upon entering the program. It is one of the more quantitatively heavy courses and does not
contain any explicit group project. This allows me to see a clearer picture of how peers affect
individual outcomes, without worrying about potential “free-rider” problems that are common
if the same grade is given to all team members. Grades in this class are also often requested by
potential employers as a part of an application package, making students motivated to perform
well.
My results indicate that peers do have an effect on students’ grades in the Managerial Fi-
nance course. First of all, I find that a high proportion of peers with STEM degrees has a
negative effect on student’s grade. Second, there is some evidence that students assigned to
teams with low GPA peers perform better in the finance course. Because of my dataset’s na-
ture, I can explore the heterogeneities in the peer effects, particularly how different types of
students are affected by their peers. I find that peer effects are heterogeneous across students
of different ability levels. Academically weaker students benefit from having a high fraction of
low admission GPA peers in their group. In comparison, stronger students have higher grades
if they are in a team with peers in the top quartile of the admission GPA distribution. Mean-
while, a high proportion of top GMAT peers has a negative effect on the grades of similar
ability students. Heterogeneous peer effects indicate that there may be a Pareto improving way
of allocating students across teams.
I use the survey data to explore two potential reasons for these findings. First, I look at the
effect of peers on the number of hours students spend studying for the finance class alone and
with the team. I find that students assigned to groups with top GMAT peers spend more time
studying with their team.
Second, I consider the non-cognitive characteristics of students and whether those could
explain the results. I discover that GMAT scores are negatively correlated with the “Agreeable-
ness” score from the personality questionnaire. Using the answers to the question about the
roles students take during group study, I find that students with the STEM background are the
most likely to play “devil’s advocate”: argue the case points and challenge their colleagues.
Taking all of the results together, I posit that peers with top GMAT scores may be most
likely to be critical and inflexible, thus creating a suboptimal study atmosphere in the group.
While they may encourage their teammates to spend time studying with the team, this study
time does not appear to be effective and does not help students achieve better grades. Similarly,
students with STEM backgrounds like to engage in arguments over the case points. While this
behaviour may be useful for the study process in moderation, having many team members who
enjoy arguing may create a hostile environment. Given that students of similar ability levels
(as measured by undergraduate GPA) perform better if they are placed in the same groups, I
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conclude that having a positive atmosphere during the study meeting may be the key to a good
performance in the course.
Many North American MBA programs divide students into learning teams. To my knowl-
edge, these allocations are usually done by following some common-sense rules deemed ap-
propriate by the administration. The main goal is to create diverse teams that would expose
students to various peers and create a fair and equal opportunity learning environment. The
findings of my paper will help improve the allocation rules: one clear implication is that mix-
ing students of different abilities may not be the most optimal way of creating teams. Instead,
creating more uniform groups may be a way to improve students’ experience. Another aspect
of group formation that may need to be taken more seriously is the students’ personalities and
communication styles. Students may need to be instructed on effective group work strategies;
for example, they should be warned against “steamrolling” over their teammates and taught
how to deal with difficult groupmates without letting them affect the study process.
One of the advantages of looking at peer effects among MBA students is that the learning
process in the MBA program is designed to mimic the work environment these students will
encounter once they graduate. In particular, this MBA program heavily relies on the use of
cases for the teaching process, meaning that students learn how to tackle problems and analyze
issues as a group. This also means that my findings are potentially transferable to any work
environment where employees work in groups or teams. The results of this paper could provide
important insights into the possible improvements in team dynamics and, ultimately, team
productivity.
Finally, I address one of the potential issues with some of the peer effects in education re-
search. Many of the papers on the subject use cumulative GPA or some other average grade
as an outcome. To illustrate the difference between the peer effects on average vs. individual
course outcomes, I use the grades for Managerial Finance class and supplement this data with
the grades in a qualitative, group project-based course called Leading People in Organizations.
These two courses are complete opposites, both in terms of the content and evaluations, allow-
ing me to approximate a student’s average grade in a program. There is no reason to believe
that peers will have the same effects on different courses since they require different skills and
knowledge. I show that focusing on the average grade may lead to false conclusions about the
absence of peer effects. This is a simple observation, but an important issue to consider in any
research that finds a lack of peer effects when looking at an average grade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the relevant literature
on peer effects in higher education; section 3 describes the data used in this paper in detail;
section 4 talks about the empirical strategy for the analysis and provides the results; section 5
includes the discussion of average GPA vs. individual course grades peer effects and section 6
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concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
While there is a lot of research on peer effects in general, I will focus my attention on the
branch of recent literature that deals with peer effects in education and higher education in
particular.1 Since the endogeneity of peer groups formation presents a significant hurdle in
investigating the causality of peer effects, researchers try to identify the situations where peers
are exogenously assigned such as the assignment of roommates in university/college residences
or random distribution of students across classes and sections.
Sacerdote (2001) uses the data on random assignment of roommates in Dartmouth. He
finds limited peer effects on academic achievement; however, he does find some evidence of
peer effects on the social outcomes (e.g. fraternity choice). Another well-known paper on the
subject by Zimmerman (2003) uses a similar setting of random assignment of roommates in
Williams College to see whether different ability peers as measured by the SAT score influence
their roommates. He finds that students in the middle of the SAT distribution are somewhat
negatively affected by the low ability peers. Finally, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006)
use the Berea Panel Study and find evidence of peer effects on grade outcomes and drop-out
decisions among Berea College students.
An alternative way of finding exogenously assigned peer groups is to consider class, co-
hort or squadron peers.Hoxby (2000) considers the peer effects in elementary school classroom
setting. Using an identification strategy for peer effects using the gender and racial composi-
tion variation in the adjacent school cohorts, she finds some gender-specific peer influence.
For example, both males and females perform better in a class with a high proportion of fe-
males. Using a similar strategy of using the variation in gender composition in adjacent school
cohorts, Lavy and Schlosser (2011) present some evidence and mechanisms of gender peer
effects. They also find that a higher proportion of female students positively affects the aca-
demic achievement outcomes of all students. However, the effect of a number of females in the
classroom may or may not be the same at the college level as it is at the secondary education
level. One particular paper that looks at the effect of female peers at the university level is
Oosterbeek and van Ewijk (2014). The authors run an experiment at the University of Amster-
dam’s economics/business department. They randomly assign different proportions of females
in different “sections” of the class and find no significant peer effects.
Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2013) use a slightly different approach to deal with the endo-
geneity problem. They use a unique dataset from the US AirForce Academy, where students
1For a detailed survey of the literature on peer effects in education see Epple and Romano (2011).
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are randomly divided into squadrons of 30 people each. Authors first look at the historical
data to estimate peer effects and find that there is a positive effect of high ability peers on low
ability students. This motivated an experiment: authors formed the squadrons in the following
manner. Some squadrons (treatment) consisted of mainly high and low ability students, while
others (control) had high, middle and low ability participants. Surprisingly, the findings show
a lack of positive effect of high ability peers in the treatment groups. The authors explain that
perhaps students form their own smaller subnetworks within a squadron by the ability level,
thus limiting the effect of their peers with different levels of ability.
Finally, some researchers take advantage of experimental or quasi-experimental settings.
There is usually a random (or quasi-random) peer group assignment, and in some cases, these
groups are small; thus, the aforementioned problems of students forming smaller subgroups
can be avoided. However, these papers mainly document the presence (or absence) of peer
effects rather than attempt to look into the mechanisms behind them. Hansen, Owan, and Pan
(2015) consider knowledge spillover in an undergraduate management class. They find that
male-dominant groups perform worse than mixed or female dominant groups. Members of
the groups that were more diversified in terms of age and gender perform better on exams.
Lu and Anderson (2015) use a random assignment to the seats in a Chinese middle school to
find evidence of peer effects. They document a positive effect of female peers on female stu-
dents. Authors identify that a “boutique” model - where peers benefit from group homogeneity
- would generate their results. Jain and Kapoor (2015) compare the two groups of peers: ex-
ogenously assigned study groups and roommates in an Indian university. They find that study
groups have a low impact on academic achievement, while informal social interactions with
roommates have significant and positive effects. They indicate that low ability students benefit
from high ability peers, but the relationship does not go the other way. Booij, Leuven, and
Oosterbeek (2015) use data from an experiment where they manipulate the composition of tu-
torial groups according to students’ ability levels. They find that low ability students benefit
from being in the groups with similar level students, while high ability students are not affected
by the switch from the mixed ability to similar ability groups. They also indicate that lower
ability students tend to be more involved in the study process in the tracked groups.
One of the more recent papers on the subject of peer effects in education, Feld and Zolitz
(2017) discovers that peer effects appear to be channelled through the changes in group inter-
action rather than, for example, a teacher’s effort. Authors find that in a German university,
where students are divided into sections of 16 students each, students allocated to sections with
high ability students generally benefit. However, they note that this effect is heterogeneous.
Low ability students are actually harmed by high ability peers, while high ability peers benefit
from being grouped together.
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My paper contributes to the literature on the peer effects in education by confirming the
results found in above-mentioned research - that grouping similar students together may be
beneficial for their academic achievement. In addition, I use the results from the “Big Five”
evaluation to find evidence that can be supportive of the hypothesis that students’ academic
results might be affected by the group communication rather than simple characteristics of the
peers.
Another area where peer effects play an important role is in the workplace, and especially
the workplace with a team environment. One of the features of the MBA program is that stu-
dents who enter it come from a variety of academic backgrounds (although they obviously have
a common interest in advancing their managerial knowledge). Thus, the learning teams that
are created among these students have a close similarity to the teams in a work environment.
The students are expected to work on a variety of projects together, resolve conflicts on their
own and overall, exhibit professionalism when dealing with their teammates.
The findings from the literature on peer effects at the workplace are also mixed. Guryan,
Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009) exploits the random assignment of golf players to four-player
teams to investigate the presence of peer effects in a golf tournament. They find no evidence
that higher ability players have an effect on their teammates and suggest a few possible expla-
nations for their findings. Chan, Li, and Pierce (2013) take advantage of being able to observe
salespeople in a departments store in a variety of incentive schemes. In particular, they con-
sider individual and team performance-based commission and conclude that different incentive
schemes prone people to respond differently and peer effects are a crucial factor to consider
in creating incentive schemes and allocating teams in a workplace. Bandiera, Barankay, and
Rasul (2013) show that team-based incentives affect both individual effort and team compo-
sition. In particular, the introduction of team incentives results in workers choosing to form
teams with other workers of similar ability rather than their friends. This, in turn, impacts the
productivity of the firm. Mas and Moretti (2009) examine the high-frequency data from a su-
permarket chain. They note that cashiers of higher ability have a strong positive effect on their
peers in close proximity.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Program and Course Description
The dataset used in this paper is constructed using the demographic and administrative admis-
sion data from an MBA program at a leading Canadian University and the results of a survey
of MBA students. The MBA program lasts one year, and each year it admits approximately
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120 students. Students are randomly divided into two sections, and students in each section
take all the classes together for the first 6 months of the program. Professors teaching in two
sections generally differ; however, the syllabus and the material covered is the same. The data
covers six cohorts of students who entered the program in 2011-2016. The data is available for
one section for the year 2011 and for both sections for 2012-2016, which results in a total of
611 observations.
The administrative data on the students of the MBA program includes students’ demo-
graphic and academic background characteristics, such as gender, cumulative GPA from the
previous degree (“Admission GPA”), GMAT score, previous degree major, number of months
of work experience and the industry in which the work experience has been acquired, mother
tongue and immigration status. Approximately a third of students are female, and about 70% of
students are Canadian citizens. Just under 20% are international students, and the rest are Per-
manent Residents. Students come from a variety of academic backgrounds: 40% of students
have some sort of business or economics-related degree; a significant portion (about 30%) have
STEM background; the rest have humanities or social science (other than economics) degrees.
The average GPA grade from the previous degree is 77%, and the average GMAT score is
660 (out of 800) points. The summary statistics are presented in Table 1.1. In addition, I col-
lect information on students’ assigned learning teams and the grade in the Managerial Finance
course, which I use as a main academic outcome.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
VARIABLE 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Female 33.9% 28.3% 22.9% 31.2% 26.8% 26.8%
Commerce Degree 41.3% 46.5% 46.7% 39.8% 47.8% 54.5%
STEM Degree 42.8% 43.3% 42.6% 51.61% 39.1% 36.5%
Canadian Students 68.3% 68.5% 71.3% 68.8% 73.9 % 73.6%
Admission GPA 76.4 77 77.33 77.6 77.29 77.16
GMAT 669 667 660 655 656 665
Number of observations 62 127 122 93 138 145
Managerial Finance is an introductory finance course in which students learn basic corpo-
rate finance concepts, such as capital structure, asset pricing, interest rate calculation etc. The
main teaching method employed for virtually all classes in the MBA program is teaching with
the use of “cases”. A case describes a real or hypothetical firm that is facing a finance-related
problem and needs to make a decision. Students are asked to perform an analysis of a sit-
uation and present potential solutions to the problem. The case is taken up in class, and all
students are expected to participate in the discussion and offer their suggestions. This course is
required for all students in the program, and it runs in the first semester. The final grade for the
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Managerial Finance course consists of the weighted average grade for the written assignments:
midterm and final exam, and the class contribution grade. For the main part of my analysis
I focus on the written grade component. While there is no explicit group component in the
class, students are expected to work with their assigned learning teams to prepare for lectures
and exams. A general format for the midterm is short answer questions: some questions test
the knowledge of terms and definitions used in class, and some require calculations. The final
exam, on the other hand, consists of the analysis of a case study. It requires students to read
a case describing a problem that a company is facing, provide a detailed analysis of the issues
and make a recommendation. The class contribution is recorded in every class by a Teaching
Assistant.2 Students are given a grade of 3 for a significant, meaningful contribution; grade of
2 for an average insight; and a grade of 1 for a quick comment or a definition. Students may
have multiple contributions per class, although it is somewhat mediated by the instructor: he
may cold call on a student with a low contribution level or pick a student with less contribution
over the one with a high contribution if there are several students willing to answer a question.
The final grades are bell-curved with a mean of 80% and a standard deviation of 7. Students
are told in advance about the bell-curving process.
In Section 6 I use a proxy for an average program grade to illustrate the importance of
picking a correct outcome for the analysis of peer effects. To create this proxy, I use the grades
in Managerial Finance and Leading People in Organization (LPO) courses. The latter is a
very qualitative course, where students learn effective techniques for leading and managing
employees in an organization. The grade for this course consists of participation and group
project components. The course runs in the first and second semesters, so for consistency, I
use the mid-point grade, which is calculated at the end of the first semester of the program.
While some students find LPO an interesting and important course, it appears to me that most
students do not treat it with the same rigour as other, more traditional courses (e.g. Finance,
Accounting, Marketing). So, LPO is very different from finance, making it a good grade to use
in the construction of the program average proxy.
I divide students into three groups according to their previous degrees: commerce/economics,
STEM and “other”, which includes mostly students with arts and humanities degrees, as well
as a handful of students with a degree in social sciences other than Economics. There are
two reasons for this separation. First and foremost, these are the main education background
categories used to allocate students across groups. Second, since the outcome is a grade in
an introductory finance class, students with Commerce degrees may already be familiar with
concepts covered in class. Also, due to the quantitative nature of finance, I believe that students
with STEM backgrounds should be able to master the concepts faster than students who may
2Starting from 2015, the contribution grade is recorded by the instructor
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need a refresher in math.
1.3.2 Learning Teams
After being divided into sections, students are assigned to learning teams by the administrative
staff. The teams are assigned based on their observable characteristics. The main criteria used
in team assignment (in order of importance) are as follows: gender, previous degree major,
work experience, immigration status, mother tongue.
The strictest requirement is the gender one. Based on previous years’ student experience,
program administration reports that having two women per group results in the best student
experience, especially for female students. Given the small number of female students in the
program, each year there are some groups with no women.3 While the rest of the criteria are
important, the data suggests a variation in the number of STEM major students or the number of
international students across groups. The reason for these allocation rules is to ensure fairness
and to create a diverse and safe environment. The main purpose of the learning team is to study
and prepare for the various classes as a group and complete group assignments for some of the
courses.
Students are not allowed to switch their teams. If a conflict arises, students are expected to
seek advice from their program coordinator and resolve the conflict. Only in the most extreme
cases will the student be allowed to switch the team. According to the program coordinator, no
such situation occurred within the last few years. Thus, students themselves have no input on
how the learning teams are assigned.
During the interviews with some of the students (see section 3.4 for more information),
I discovered that students are mostly working with the assigned teams at the beginning of
the program. As time progresses, students get to know more of their peers in the program.
They also get much busier (e.g. employment information sessions, interviews, and networking
events start near the end of the first semester). Thus, students spend less time with their team
and more time studying alone or with other friends. However, because I focus on the courses
that run in the first semester, I believe that I capture any effects group mates have on each other.
Finally, students have a fixed, assigned seating in the classroom: students sit surrounded by
their learning team members. Thus, if there are any peer effects that arise from the proximity
of seating in a classroom, these effects will still come mostly from the learning team peers.
Students are encouraged by the program administration and the instructors to spend time
studying with their learning teams. Each team is assigned a faculty mentor, whose role is to
3Due to some students dropping out of the program, there are some teams with only one female student.
Especially in 2015, 4 students dropped out of the program, and three were female. The dropouts usually happen
very early in the semester, which should not be disruptive to students’ work.
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provide guidance and aid in any conflict resolution. There are special meeting rooms reserved
for each team for the semester. During the team meetings, students discuss the cases: using
the framework they learn in class, they discuss the main issues, thoroughly analyze the case
and propose solutions. Each team may have its own style, but the goal is to get ready for the
case discussion in class. Occasionally, instructors will give teams specific assignments, for
example, to argue for or against a certain case point, so teams have to prepare their arguments
and present their points in class.
There are several complicated interactions students may have with their learning team
peers. First of all, there may be a direct knowledge transfer. For example, students with a
commerce background may be quite familiar with most of the technical material covered in
class and may explain it to the teammates who are falling behind. Second, students may be
affected by the interactions during team discussions. A positive, cooperative discussion may
lead to a better understanding of the material. Since case analysis is a major component of
Managerial Finance grade (class participation and final exam are based solely on the case dis-
cussion), students’ interactions with peers during the team meetings play a crucial role in their
preparedness for the class. These channels may be affected by any number of peers’ charac-
teristics, so my goal in this paper is to narrow down the characteristics that seem to matter for
peer effects and propose potential mechanisms behind why those characteristics matter.
1.3.3 Survey
To gain some insight into the potential mechanisms behind the peer effects, I ran a survey
among the three cohorts of MBA students during their second or third months in the program.
This corresponded to the approximate midpoint of the Finance course. The survey was con-
ducted in person; students were first introduced to the topic and goal of the research project
and then presented with the survey, which they had 15 minutes to complete.
Aside from the standard demographic questions, there are three main parts to the survey. In
order to establish a student’s social network, the first question asked them to list up to 7 friends
in the program. The last question of the survey asked them to indicate who, out of the given
list of students, they talk to, with whom they study and with whom they socialize outside of
school. Second, students were asked about their study habits, in particular, their study habits
for the course of interest. I.e. how many hours a week do they study for all courses/Managerial
Finance course; how many hours a week they spend studying alone/with their learning team;
how many hours do they spend socializing with their friends outside of class. They were also
asked about their beliefs about performance in the Managerial Finance course. The goal was
to approximate the students’ effort levels when it comes to the class of interest.
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Finally, students were asked questions about their non-cognitive characteristics, i.e. Big
Five personality traits: extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability,
and openness. Extroversion measures how outgoing a student is; agreeableness score tells
us whether a student is critical and inflexible; conscientiousness is a measure of being respon-
sible and serious about studying; emotional stability tells how easily a person gets nervous or
anxious and, finally, openness is a loose measure of creativity, openness to new experiences.
Given the limited amount of time students had to fill out the survey, the shortened questionnaire
developed by Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann Jr. (2003) was used. This questionnaire included
ten simple questions, asking respondents to evaluate how closely given adjectives describe
them. Each question measures one of the Big Five personality traits. Gosling et al. report good
convergent correlations with longer tests of personality traits, especially for the traits which
are most important for this research: extroversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. A
sample survey is provided in the Appendix.
The response rate for the survey was approximately 76% in 2014, 60% in 2015 and 67%
in 2016. The summary statistics of the observable characteristics of respondents are presented
in Table 1.2. In general, the proportions of female students, international students and the
proportions of students with various background degrees correspond to those in the overall
sample.
One common issue with any survey data is the measurement error due to the self-reporting:
in particular, it is possible that students are not correctly reporting the number of hours they
spend studying for a course. For example, they could intentionally misreport the hours to
appear more studious. I checked the study hours data for consistency in two ways. First, I
added up the hours studied that student reported and checked that that number is less than the
reasonable number of hours that a student may be expected to study outside of class over a
week (I assumed that 60 hours is a maximum). Second, I checked whether or not the reported
number of hours spent studying with the team makes sense given the reports of other team
members. There are two caveats: first, there could be errors in individual reporting since
students are reporting an average weekly number of hours studied; second, I do not have data
on all of the team members, and students do not have to study with all of the teammates for
it to be considered “studying with a learning team”. After these checks, I dropped from the
sample one student who reported studying for 30 hours alone and 20 hours with the team
for Managerial Finance, while his teammates reported the number of hours close to the class
average.
It may be non-trivial to check the validity of the personality characteristics evaluation.
However, there are some checks that give me confidence in the correctness of the results. For
example, conscientiousness is positively related to the Admission GPA grade and the number
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Table 1.2: Survey Participants Descriptive Statistics
Cohort of 2015 Cohort of 2016 Cohort of 2017
Percentage of female students 28.13 29.89 23.00
32 26 29
Percentage of students with commerce degree 39.7 37.21 43.00
49 39 54.48
Percentage of students with STEM degree 45.45 43.02 42.00
43 42 36.55
Percentage of Canadian or PR students 85.94 45.35 67.35
68 67 73.61
Avg admission GPA 77.27 78.22 75.92
(6.06) (7.28) (7.79)
77.6 77.28 77.15
Avg GMAT score 654.03 667 671.97
(47.89) (45.81) (48.38)
655 656 665.47
Number of learning teams 18 24 24
Number of students (surveyed) 78 98 100
Number of students (registered) 103 130 143
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Cohort average is italicised.
of hours studied for Finance; Extroversion is positively and significantly related to the number
of hours spent socializing with peers; Agreeableness has a positive relationship with team satis-
faction. These correlations provide me with some evidence that the personality characteristics
are measured more or less correctly.
1.3.4 Interviews
Finally, to gain a deeper understanding of how the group study process works, I conducted
interviews with some of the students from the 2015-2016 cohort. The interviews took place
towards the end of the semester, when students were already done with the Finance course.
I asked them a series of questions about their learning teams, other peers in the program and
some of their study preferences. The detailed description of results is attached in the Ap-
pendix.4
There were three key pieces of information I was able to learn through the interviews. First,
students spend the most time studying with their learning teams at the beginning of the pro-
4The detailed transcripts of the interviews are available upon request.
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gram. As the term progresses, two things happen: students meet and get to know peers outside
of the learning team, and students’ schedule becomes busier due to the recruitment campaigns.
But, since the course of interest, Managerial Finance, runs during the first term of the program,
it is reasonable to believe that learning team peers affect the choices and outcomes of a student.
The second finding is that students do not necessarily prefer studying with friends. Instead,
they may choose peers with whom they do not socialize outside of the program but whom they
consider being good group members. While this fact may not directly impact the findings of
this paper, I can conclude that students mostly study with their learning teams until they get a
better understanding of other students’ abilities, which may take longer than forming a friend-
ship. Finally, I find that majority of students care about their performance in the course since
their grades may have a direct impact on their employment opportunities. Students who were
interviewed report that about half of the class is interested in a career in Finance or Consulting
(which also aligns with the results of the survey) and that most companies hiring for consulting
or finance roles request students’ transcripts. Thus, most students take the Managerial Finance
course very seriously and put in effort in preparation for the class.
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Results - Administrative Data
To estimate the peer effects among the students in the MBA program, I run the following re-
gression on the different components of the Managerial Finance grade using the administrative
data from the last five cohorts of MBA students.
yi = α1 + α2Xi + α3X̄−i + Year × S ection + εi (1.1)
Where yi is a grade (written or class participation) in Managerial Finance course, Xi is a collec-
tion of personal demographic and educational characteristics and X̄−i j is a collection of learning
team peer characteristics. The peer characteristics are defined as the average value for the stu-
dent’s learning team peers, not including the student herself (e.g. for a student who has a
science degree and is a member of a six-person team that has two other science graduates, the
value of the fraction of peers with a STEM degree will be 0.4).5 In order to control for peers’
ability levels, I generate four variables: fraction of learning team peers in the top 20% of class
admission GPA distribution, fraction of learning team peers in the bottom 20% of class admis-
sion GPA distribution, and two variables of the fraction of learning team peers in the top and
bottom 20% of class GMAT distribution.
5I control for peers’ educational background and for their ability levels. I tested a variety of specifications,
including own and peers’ work experience and language. These variables do not influence the results, and thus I
omit them in the final specification.
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The results of the regression (1) are presented in Table 1.3. Column 1 shows the results on
the written component of the Managerial Finance grade, and column 2 has the results of the
regression on the class participation grade.
First, let’s investigate the results of the regression on the written component. As expected,
students with higher admission GPA and higher GMAT scores do better on Managerial Finance
class tests. Students with a background in Commerce or Economics perform better as well
because the class of interest is an introductory Finance, and students with Commerce degrees
are most likely familiar with at least some of the concepts covered. I also find that students
with degrees in STEM fields get higher grades on the written component of the Managerial
Finance course. Domestic students perform better than international students, which could be
due to both language considerations and the similarity of undergraduate and MBA program
courses. Female students do worse than male students on average.
In terms of peer effects, there are several interesting findings. First of all, a higher propor-
tion of STEM peers is negatively correlated with the Managerial Finance written grade. For
illustration, substituting one peer with a STEM background for one with a commerce back-
ground may increase a student’s grade in a written component of the Finance class by 1%.
This is curious, given that students with STEM backgrounds perform better than students with
humanities and social science degrees. I would expect these students to be able to help their
peers, at least when it comes to the quantitative side of a finance course. This finding indicates
that there are some non-trivial mechanisms behind the peer effects, and I investigate it further
using the data from the survey.
Second, note that there is a significant positive effect of the higher proportion of peers with
bottom admission GPA scores. Once again, this is a bit of a puzzle since one might expect that
low admission GPA students may benefit from having high ability peers, but it is unusual to see
that low GPA students may also be helpful, on average. I discuss this result in more detail in
the next section, when I show that this peer effect is heterogeneous across students of various
abilities.
Now, consider the results of regression (1) when the outcome is class participation grade,
presented in the second column of Table 1.3. The coefficients on the personal characteristics
are similar (if not in magnitude, then in sign) to the coefficients in column 1. However, no
peer effects are significant at the usual levels. It is important to note that participation grade is
different in nature than the written component grade: the driving force behind the participation
grade is the student’s willingness to participate in class, not necessarily the student’s ability or
even preparedness. In addition, instructors do cold-call on students who have not participated in
a while and tend to choose those with lower participation if several students wish to contribute
to class discussion. To look at a clearer picture of peer effects, I focus on the written component
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Admission GPA 0.158*** 0.217***
(0.0433) (0.0560)
GMAT score 0.0297*** 0.0151**
(0.00507) (0.00626)
Degree related to commerce/economics 5.223*** 2.831***
(0.880) (1.015)




Domestic student 2.924*** 1.541**
(0.575) (0.608)
Fraction of LT Peers with -2.890 -1.933
Commerce/Economics degree (2.238) (2.004)
Fraction of LT Peers with STEM degree -5.250** -1.031
(2.187) (2.125)
Fraction if LT peers who are -0.306 -1.028
domestic students (1.627) (1.595)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 20% 2.259* -0.857
of Adm. GPA distribution (1.355) (1.463)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 20% -2.177 -0.00100
of GMAT distribution (1.526) (1.823)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 20% 1.262 2.198
of Adm. GPA distribution (1.661) (1.866)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 20% -1.760 0.602





F test model 7.166 3.065
Standard errors are clustered at the learning team level. LT - Learning Team
Year × Section fixed effects are included in the regression.
Data source: business school administrative dataset 2011-2016, N=661
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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of the total grade for the rest of this paper. This outcome gives me results that are less muddled
by a student’s own non-cognitive characteristics (willingness to participate in class, in this case)
and the instructor’s management of class discussion. I do include the results of the regression
on the participation grade in the Appendix.
1.4.1 Heterogeneous effects
In addition to the regression on the full sample, in order to explore the potential heterogeneous
effects across different types of students, I split the data according to the observable charac-
teristics: gender, previous degree, immigration status, and terciles based on two measures of
ability: GMAT score and admission GPA. I then run the same regression (1) on each subgroup.
Note that I assign students to different grade (score) terciles based on their standing in the class.
6 7
The results of these regressions are presented in the tables below (Tables 1.4-1.8). I find
evidence of heterogeneous peer effects, which aligns with the previous findings in the literature.
Since I have some puzzling results in the regression on the whole sample, which I discussed
above, I also look for potential explanations in the subsample regression results.
First, I separate the students by their ability levels as measured by their admission GPA
scores. Recall that the whole sample results showed the negative effect of STEM peers, as well
as the positive effects of high proportions of bottom Admission GPA peers. Looking at the
results in Table 1.4, we see that the negative effect of STEM students is the most pronounced
for the students in the bottom tercile of admission GPA distribution. However, the coefficient
is negative for students of all abilities and is decreasing in value with the increase in GPA.
Peers with low admission GPA scores are beneficial for students of the same ability levels.
We can also now see that the top ability students also benefit from the top ability peers! This
finding is aligned with what has been discovered in the previous literature as well, indicating
that there might be a benefit from grouping students of similar ability levels together. Recall
that Feld and Zolitz (2017) also find the heterogeneous peers effects, although they only see
one side of it: the positive impact of high ability students being grouped together.
To sum up, Table 1.4 provides us with some interesting findings and some intuition re-
garding the potential mechanisms behind the peer effects. First, I find that the peer effects
6The terciles are determined by student’s position in the section distribution of admission GPA (or GMAT
scores), not the distribution of the overall sample. I believe that because students are graded on the curve, what
matters is their relative standing in the class, not the whole sample. It is useful to note, however, that the tercile
split is not much different from year to year, and cut off values differ only by a couple of percent across cohorts.
7The difference in the tercile sizes is due to the discrete nature of GPA and GMAT scores. A number of
observations are grouped on the border between lower and middle tercile, around 75% or GMAT scores of 650;
these observations are assigned to the lower terciles.
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Table 1.4: OLS regression on Finance written grade: by terciles of admission GPA distribution












Admission GPA 0.158*** 0.341*** 0.166 0.154
(0.0433) (0.110) (0.349) (0.227)
GMAT score 0.0297*** 0.0262*** 0.0187** 0.0493***
(0.00507) (0.00856) (0.00887) (0.0105)
Degree related to 5.223*** 4.468*** 5.695*** 6.816**
commerce/economics (0.880) (1.245) (1.462) (2.736)
Degree in STEM 2.056** 2.241* 2.575 2.319
(0.938) (1.218) (1.590) (2.881)
Female -1.848*** -3.157*** -0.495 -1.191
(0.601) (0.950) (1.162) (1.231)
Domestic Student 2.924*** 2.620*** 1.674 3.091***
(0.575) (0.979) (1.221) (1.060)
Fraction of LT Peers with -2.890 -4.047 -3.155 -2.106
Commerce/Economics degree (2.238) (3.331) (4.207) (4.051)
Fraction of LT Peers with -5.250** -6.981** -5.421 -2.368
STEM degree (2.187) (3.134) (4.756) (3.928)
Fraction if LT peers who are -0.306 3.501 -1.142 -5.678*
domestic students (1.627) (2.373) (2.809) (3.047)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom -2.177 -3.286 0.102 -3.025
20% of GMAT distribution (1.526) (2.856) (3.202) (2.587)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 2.259* 3.850* -2.111 1.111
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.355) (2.077) (2.829) (2.757)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 1.262 -1.000 -1.935 6.909**
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.661) (2.580) (3.180) (2.804)
Fraction of LT peers in the top -1.760 -0.481 0.0613 -1.505
20% of GMAT distribution (1.479) (2.125) (3.008) (2.637)
Constant 46.69*** 35.27*** 54.22* 33.63*
(5.039) (9.192) (29.48) (18.96)
Observations 661 298 175 188
R-squared 0.172 0.194 0.219 0.320
F test model 7.166 6.300 2.959 3.794
Standard errors are clustered at the learning team level. LT - Learning Team
Year × Section fixed effects are included in the regression.
Data source: business school administrative dataset 2011-2016. N=661.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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are heterogeneous, with students benefiting from having similar ability peers in their teams.
And second, the negative effect of STEM peers stays negative for all types of students. My
hypothesis is that grouping students by ability will improve confidence levels in low ability
students while allowing top ability students to study at their higher pace. Students of similar
ability may be more comfortable asking questions during their meetings and contribute to the
discussion. Having a comfortable study atmosphere in a group may be the key to success-
ful academic outcomes. The negative effect of STEM peers may be explained using similar
logic. The stereotypical image of a STEM student is someone who is confident, not afraid to
ask questions or challenge ideas. Often, when it comes to hard sciences, there is one correct
answer, so students with this type of background may be perceived as tough during group dis-
cussions. Perhaps, having a teammate who enjoys arguments during group discussion may be
detrimental to the quality of study group meetings. I put this hypothesis to the test using the
data from my survey in the following sections.
Another way of measuring students’ ability as it pertains to the MBA program is to look
at their GMAT scores. While GMAT scores are correlated with the admission GPA grades,
the correlation is not perfect, with a correlation coefficient of 0.2036. There are a couple
of reasons why this correlation coefficient is lower than might be expected. First, for some
students, GMAT may be less difficult than the courses they took in their undergraduate degree
(for example, for engineering students). So, these students will get high scores on GMAT even
if their admission GPA is lower than average. The second reason could be that students with
low undergraduate GPA may spend more time and effort preparing for the GMAT, which will
result in a higher score. The GMAT can be taken multiple times until a student is satisfied with
their score - so it is possible that the GMAT may be measuring a different type of ability or
even some other characteristic (e.g. grit, motivation).
Table 1.5 shows the results of regression (1) when the sample is split by GMAT tercile.
STEM peers have a negative effect on Managerial Finance grades for students in the bottom
and middle terciles of the GMAT score distribution. The fraction of peers in the bottom of the
admission GPA distribution has a positive effect on low GMAT students while not significantly
affecting the middle and top terciles of GMAT distribution. On the other hand, the Fraction
of LT peers in the top 20% of GMAT distribution has a strong negative effect on top GMAT
students.
Thus, while peer effects still appear to be heterogeneous for students with different GMAT
levels, it does not seem that grouping top GMAT students together would result in better grades
for them. In fact, we now see that the top GMAT students may actually be harmful to their peers
with equal ability level. This is a counterintuitive finding that requires further investigation.
Next, I look for the potential differences across peer effects of male/female students, in-
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Table 1.5: OLS regression on Finance written grade: by the terciles of GMAT score distribution












Admission GPA 0.158*** 0.252*** 0.0990 0.146
(0.0433) (0.0648) (0.0849) (0.0944)
GMAT score 0.0297*** 0.0261* 0.0535 0.0639***
(0.00507) (0.0133) (0.0339) (0.0211)
Degree related to 5.223*** 4.772*** 6.848*** 5.934***
commerce/economics (0.880) (1.141) (1.757) (1.665)
Degree in STEM 2.056** 0.285 4.594*** 3.782**
(0.938) (1.219) (1.747) (1.721)
Female -1.848*** -1.068 -1.484 -2.380*
(0.601) (1.018) (1.033) (1.281)
Domestic Student 2.924*** 4.536*** 2.131* 2.407**
(0.575) (1.162) (1.107) (1.022)
Fraction of LT Peers with -2.890 -2.009 -3.057 -1.116
Commerce/Economics degree (2.238) (3.788) (4.293) (3.526)
Fraction of LT Peers with -5.250** -8.347** -6.201 1.223
STEM degree (2.187) (3.558) (4.031) (3.128)
Fraction if LT peers who are -0.306 5.500** -5.587* -1.894
domestic students (1.627) (2.686) (3.214) (2.794)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom -2.177 -2.548 -2.337 -0.194
20% of GMAT distribution (1.526) (3.270) (3.073) (2.203)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 2.259* 4.245* 0.616 2.027
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.355) (2.401) (2.481) (2.023)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 1.262 1.105 2.627 0.883
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.661) (2.415) (3.160) (2.766)
Fraction of LT peers in the top -1.760 1.661 -1.904 -5.656**
20% of GMAT distribution (1.479) (2.400) (2.594) (2.737)
Constant 46.69*** 37.45*** 37.38* 20.63
(5.039) (9.467) (22.02) (14.82)
Observations 661 257 201 203
R-squared 0.172 0.222 0.235 0.216
F test model 7.166 4.422 2.837 2.945
Standard errors are clustered at the learning team level. LT - Learning Team
Year × Section fixed effects are included in the regression.
Data source: business school administrative dataset 2011-2016. N=661.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
24 Chapter 1. Peer Effects in anMBA Program
ternational/domestic students and students with different degrees. Interestingly, even their
own characteristics have different effects on the written component of Finance grade for fe-
male/male students (Table 1.6). For example, while all students with STEM degrees perform
better in finance than students with other degrees, this effect is stronger and statistically signif-
icant for male students. On the other hand, domestic female students have a stronger positive
boost than male domestic students. It also seems that admission GPA is a better predictor for a
higher finance grade for female students than for their male counterparts.
In terms of peer effects, most have the same sign for both genders, but significance and
magnitude vary. Most notably, STEM peers have a much stronger negative effect on female
students. Once again, this might point to the role of team dynamics and personality character-
istics in the formation of peer effects.
Table 1.7 describes the results of regression (1) on international and domestic students.
Once again, even the relationship between their own characteristics and the grade in Finance
class differs. While high admission GPA predicts a higher grade in Finance class for domestic
students, it lacks predictive power in the sample of international students. GMAT, on the other
hand, is a stronger predictor of the grade for international students. This is not surprising,
given that most international students who are accepted into the MBA program have high GPA
scores, resulting in a small variance of the admission GPA scores among the international
students. Female international students perform worse than their male counterparts and than
the other female students in the program. There also appear to be some curious peer effects.
First, the fraction of peers with commerce degrees has a strong negative effect on domestic
students, while at the same time having a positive effect of similar magnitude on international
students. Second, the fraction of STEM peers also has a negative effect on the written grade for
domestic students while not having a significant effect on the grades of international students.
A higher fraction of lower ability peers is good for the grades of domestic students, while the
high fraction of top GMAT peers has a negative effect on the international students’ grades.
Finally, I show the peer effects on students with different undergraduate degrees (Table 1.8).
It seems that students with commerce/economics background are the ones who are significantly
negatively affected by STEM peers. Other groups of students are also harmed by the high
fraction of STEM peers, although these coefficients are not statistically significant at the usual
levels.
Overall, looking into heterogeneous peer effects provided new findings and puzzles. First, it
is clear that peer effects are, in fact, heterogeneous, and pairing different students with the same
peers may result in different outcomes for these students. This indicates that there might be an
improvement in how we allocate students across teams. The starkest result is that students of
similar ability levels (measured by the previous degree GPA) benefit from being assigned to the
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Table 1.6: OLS regression on Finance grade components for male and female students
(1) (2)
Written Grade - Female Written Grade - Male
Admission GPA 0.338*** 0.103**
(0.0776) (0.0521)
GMAT score 0.0299*** 0.0299***
(0.0109) (0.00693)
Degree related to 5.402*** 5.512***
commerce/economics (1.363) (1.408)
Degree in STEM 1.220 2.502*
(1.545) (1.391)
Domestic Student 4.554*** 2.269***
(1.113) (0.735)
Fraction of LT Peers with -5.244 -1.429
Commerce/Economics degree (4.559) (2.740)
Fraction of LT Peers with -8.770** -3.047
STEM degree (3.802) (2.551)
Fraction if LT peers who are 0.117 -0.697
domestic students (3.172) (2.329)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom -2.307 -2.446
20% of GMAT distribution (3.525) (1.696)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 3.491 2.102
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (2.779) (1.740)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 1.846 1.310
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (2.658) (2.020)
Fraction of LT peers in the top -3.348 -1.551





F test model 6.237 4.006
Standard errors are clustered at the learning team level.LT - Learning Team
Year × Section fixed effects are included in the regression.
Data source: business school administrative dataset 2011-2016. N=661.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: OLS regression on Finance grade components for International and Domestic stu-
dents
(1) (2)
Written Grade - Cana-
dian/PR
Written Grade - Int’l
Admission GPA 0.225*** 0.00727
(0.0571) (0.0740)
GMAT score 0.0250*** 0.0401***
(0.00628) (0.0111)
Degree related to 4.680*** 6.617*
commerce/economics (0.906) (3.420)




Fraction of LT Peers with -6.491** 6.827*
Commerce/Economics degree (2.905) (3.835)
Fraction of LT Peers with -8.707*** 5.623
STEM degree (2.816) (3.735)
Fraction if LT peers who are -0.00957 -3.146
domestic students (2.117) (3.202)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom -2.587 -0.730
20% of GMAT distribution (1.862) (2.848)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 3.543** -1.572
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.639) (2.434)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 0.979 0.587
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (2.052) (3.097)
Fraction of LT peers in the top -1.685 -4.749**





F test model 6.932 2.487
Standard errors are clustered at the learning team level. LT - Learning Team
Year × Section fixed effects are included in the regression.
Data source: business school administrative dataset 2011-2016. N=661.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: OLS regression on Finance grade components for students with different undergrad-
uate degrees












Admission GPA 0.158*** 0.246*** 0.0826 0.361*
(0.0433) (0.0743) (0.0661) (0.180)
GMAT score 0.0297*** 0.0251*** 0.0396*** -0.00478
(0.00507) (0.00795) (0.00820) (0.0208)
Degree related to 5.223***
commerce/economics (0.880)
Degree in STEM 2.056**
(0.938)
Female -1.848*** -1.763* -2.274** -1.692
(0.601) (0.900) (0.985) (2.106)
Domestic Student 2.924*** 2.703*** 2.821*** 9.863**
(0.575) (0.870) (0.824) (4.300)
Fraction of LT Peers with -2.890 -4.982 -1.167 1.398
Commerce/Economics degree (2.238) (3.414) (2.946) (10.89)
Fraction of LT Peers with -5.250** -6.011* -1.815 -8.265
STEM degree (2.187) (3.391) (2.813) (6.917)
Fraction if LT peers who are -0.306 -2.314 1.382 1.151
domestic students (1.627) (2.613) (2.320) (7.849)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom -2.177 -3.005 -1.167 -0.186
20% of GMAT distribution (1.526) (2.629) (2.346) (6.544)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 2.259* 3.332 0.650 1.629
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.355) (2.336) (1.997) (4.795)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 1.262 -0.478 0.405 6.484
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.661) (2.291) (2.592) (5.056)
Fraction of LT peers in the top -1.760 -1.136 -2.044 -5.202
20% of GMAT distribution (1.479) (2.091) (2.369) (5.569)
Constant 46.69*** 49.65*** 46.07*** 45.34**
(5.039) (8.505) (7.604) (19.26)
Observations 661 315 284 49
R-squared 0.172 0.150 0.164 0.357
F test model 7.166 2.140 2.505 1.836
Standard errors are clustered at the learning team level.LT - Learning Team
Year × Section fixed effects are included in the regression.
Data source: business school administrative dataset 2011-2016. N=661.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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same teams. On the other hand, some of the findings are still not very intuitive. Why do STEM
peers have such a negative effect on almost all groups of students? Why do top GMAT students
do worse if paired with similar peers? I address these questions in the following sections using
the data from the survey.
One thing to keep in mind while interpreting these results is that there are certain corre-
lations in the data, either by the construction of the teams or due to the correlations between
certain personal characteristics. For example, since administrators try to balance the group
composition in terms of students’ backgrounds or their immigration status, there necessarily
will be a negative correlation between a personal characteristic and average characteristic of
peers. E.g. an international student is more likely to have a higher fraction of domestic student
peers than a domestic student. Since I do control both for personal and team characteristics in
my regressions, this problem should be mostly alleviated.
Similarly, there are some student attributes that are correlated. For example, international
students are more likely to have a higher admission GPA, and STEM students tend to have
higher GMAT scores. I do not think that these correlations nullify my findings of the existence
of peer effects, but the effects of the individual characteristics may need to be interpreted with
caution, keeping in mind the correlations I mentioned above. I include the complete correlation
table of individual characteristics in the Appendix, Table 1.16.
1.5 Empirical Strategy and Results - Survey Data
I assume that peers might influence the outcomes of their classmates in two main ways. First,
they could affect the number of hours students spend studying. For example, since the learning
teams are encouraged to study together, peers with better study habits may increase the number
of hours students spend studying in the group.
Second, peers may affect the effectiveness of studying in a group and alone. For example, a
very intelligent peer may make it easier to understand the material and may be able to explain
concepts to a struggling student. On the other hand, a student who is behind in terms of class
material may prevent his peers from studying effectively. In addition, different types of peers
may affect the psychological atmosphere of the group. This could be influenced both by stu-
dents’ psychological characteristics and their ability levels. Obviously, a more argumentative
peer may make it unpleasant to study in the group. But also, students who have peers of a
similar ability to theirs may find it easier to study together rather than with peers of different
abilities.
Students, of course, could be affected through multiple channels at the same time. While
I am not able to identify the exact mechanisms behind the peer effects in this paper, I present
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some descriptive results that serve as evidence for one or more mechanisms described above.
1.5.1 Study hours
One of the most straightforward ways students may affect each other’s academic achievement
is by studying together and thus increasing the number of hours a student spends preparing
for the class. Using the survey data on individual study habits, I can see whether different
types of peers affect the number of hours students choose to study alone or with their learning
team. Combining this information with the findings from the previous section, we can get more
insights into the possible mechanisms behind the peer effects.
Using the reported number of hours studied for Managerial Finance (alone or with the
learning team) as an outcome, I run the following regression:
s ji = a0 + a1Xi + a2X̄peers + Year × S ectioni + εi (1.2)
Where j ∈ {Own, LT }, si is the number of hours student studies alone or with the team,
Xi is a vector of observable characteristics of a person i, X̄peers are the average of observable
characteristics of the peers of the person i not including the student himself.
The results presented in Table 1.9 show some interesting information. Students in teams
with many domestic peers tend to study by themselves. On the other hand, students in the
sample spend more time studying with their team if they have a high proportion of top GMAT
score peers.
Although, it is important to note that by construction of the groups, students with the highest
fraction of domestic peers will be international students. International students are more likely
to study by themselves, so this may be what is captured in the regression.
I find that while there is no strong effect of the number of hours spent studying with a team
on the Finance grade, there still is a positive relationship (see Table 1.17 in Appendix). Thus, if
top GMAT peers increase the number of hours students spend studying with the group but also
decrease the finance grade, the time students spend studying must not be very effective, which
may explain their negative effect on the grades of other top GMAT students. To look further
into this potential explanation, I explore the data on personality traits.
1.5.2 Personality traits
When working with other people, be it on a research project or on a class assignment, the
personalities of your colleagues may play a role equally or even more important than their level
of knowledge and general cognitive ability. When it comes to peer effect research, however,
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Table 1.9: OLS on the Number of hours studied alone and with the learning team, survey data
(1) (2)
OLS on the Number of
hours studying for Fi-
nance alone
OLS on the Number of
hours studying for Fi-
nance with LT






Sci/Eng Background -0.695 0.536
(0.748) (0.370)
Comm/Econ Background -0.845 0.0258
(0.817) (0.352)
Canadian or PR -0.326 0.176
(0.644) (0.302)
Fraction of LT Peers with 0.759 -0.940
STEM degree (2.335) (1.436)
Fraction of LT peers who are 3.044* 0.154
domestic students (1.563) (0.907)
Fraction of LT Peers with 3.727 -1.144
Commerce/Economics degree (2.392) (1.401)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 1.622 1.015
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.293) (0.797)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 0.232 0.0965
20% of GMAT distribution (1.609) (0.778)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 1.188 1.442
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.507) (0.948)
Fraction of LT peers in the top -0.206 2.644***





F test model 1.504 1.443
P-value of F model 0.140 0.165
Robust standard errors in parentheses. LT - Learning Team
Data source: survey data. N=191.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the mechanism that is usually assumed is that peers may aid students in studying by explicitly
helping with the classwork or alternatively hinder student’s success by being disruptive or
distracting.
In the context of this paper, peer personality characteristics could shed light on the puz-
zles in the results discussed above. To address them, I turn to the results of the survey ques-
tion aimed at evaluating students’ Big Five personality traits: extroversion, conscientiousness,
agreeableness, emotional stability and openness to new experiences. The final score (out of
14) for each of these characteristics reflects how well each characteristic applies to a student.
For example, a score of 9 in extroversion would imply that the student is more extroverted than
introverted.
To illustrate the correlations between personality characteristics and observable charac-
teristics, I run the OLS regressions with personality characteristics scores as outcomes and
observable characteristics as independent variables. The results of the regressions can be seen
in Table 1.10.
First, admission GPA is positively related to the conscientiousness score, which is in line
with the findings from previous literature as well as common-sense expectations, providing
some reassurance that the measures of personality characteristics were more or less accurate.
Interestingly, GMAT score is not related to conscientiousness, meaning that having a high GPA
and scoring well on GMAT may not necessarily require the same skills, which may explain why
the correlation between these two measures of ability is not as high as some might expect. 8
Coming back to the puzzle I encountered in previous sections, a relevant result is that
GMAT score is negatively correlated with “agreeableness” characteristic, providing some evi-
dence that top GMAT peers might be difficult to get along with. One potential story that could
explain these findings is that after controlling for admission GPA, GMAT score mainly mea-
sures student’s motivation to be in the program. Since most students write GMAT specifically
to enter this program, students with higher motivation to get in might want to spend more time
preparing for the test, take it more seriously, which could result in a better score at the end.
However, the strong motivation to do well in the program may cause these students to put pres-
sure on their teammates, causing them to study longer hours, but not necessarily increase their
productivity or knowledge.
As a side note, domestic students and students with commerce degrees also score lower
than average on the “Agreeableness” scale. If we look back at the results of regression (1),
we can see that both of these types of students have a negative, albeit not significant, effect
8If we think about what the “ability” means: it probably consists of some measure of knowledge and aptitude
plus a measure of “grit” or conscientiousness. So, it’s possible that GMAT, on the other hand, is a measure of
knowledge, aptitude, and motivation.
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Table 1.10: Regressions with personality characteristic scores as outcomes (survey data)




Adm. GPA 0.0195 0.00425 0.0343 0.0428 -0.0113
(0.0326) (0.0264) (0.0239) (0.0365) (0.0229)
GMAT -0.00562 -0.00953** 9.32e-05 -0.00829 -0.00623*
(0.00486) (0.00394) (0.00357) (0.00544) (0.00341)
Comm/Econ -0.170 -1.017** -0.295 -1.189* -0.490
Background (0.621) (0.504) (0.457) (0.696) (0.436)
STEM -0.904 -0.218 -0.167 -0.0901 -0.0990
Background (0.622) (0.505) (0.457) (0.697) (0.437)
Female -0.291 0.344 0.568 0.996* 0.332
(0.522) (0.424) (0.384) (0.585) (0.367)
Domestic 0.205 -1.329*** 0.689** 0.711 -1.038***
Student (0.474) (0.384) (0.348) (0.531) (0.333)
Constant 12.38*** 17.61*** 7.822*** 8.894** 16.82***
(3.964) (3.216) (2.914) (4.442) (2.783)
Observations 199 199 199 199 199
R-squared 0.035 0.095 0.050 0.063 0.066
F test model 1.157 3.351 1.686 2.141 2.256
Standard errors in parentheses
Data source: survey data. N=191.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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on their peers’ grades. Recall, though, that students with high fractions of domestic peers or
peers with commerce/economics degrees also tend to study more alone on average, possibly
counteracting the inefficient time spent studying with the team.
1.5.3 Roles on the Team and Team Dynamics
The number of hours students spend studying together may only tell us part of the story. Not
every hour spent studying will be effective, and it is especially clear if we consider that some
students may be more disruptive than helpful during the studying process. To better understand
the roles different types of students play during team meetings, I directly asked survey partic-
ipants how they behave or what they do most often during study sessions with their Learning
Teams. There were six possible answers, and students were allowed to select as many an-
swers as they wanted, but they did have to rank these behaviours in order of frequency, 1 being
most often. The possible answers were: explaining concepts covered in class, leading the dis-
cussion, using work experience to provide examples, playing “devil’s advocate” and arguing
certain case points with colleagues, mostly listening rather than contributing and, finally, ask-
ing questions. Most students engage in more than one behaviour during the team meeting. I
generated the indicator variables for each of these behaviours and assigned the value of 1 if a
student gave the behaviour a rank of 1 or 2, and zero otherwise.
In Table 1.11, I present the results of logit regressions, where the outcome is the indica-
tor variable of whether or not a student behaves in a certain way during the group meetings,
to illustrate the correlation between behaviours and observable characteristics. It shows that
different types of students have different behaviour styles during group meetings. Female stu-
dents prefer to ask questions, male students prefer to lead, international students share their
work experience, and STEM students like to play “devil’s advocate”. The results may shed
some light on the curious negative effect of STEM students on their peers’ finance grade. It ap-
pears that students with a STEM background are most likely to play “devil’s advocate” during
the meetings, challenging their peers, arguing about points. While some students may enjoy
some heated discussions, some may perceive this as a hostile group environment. In addition,
if students argue with their peers for the sake of arguing, it does not add much to the discussion
and does not lead to good learning outcomes. Interestingly, STEM students do not score par-
ticularly low on the “agreeableness” scale of the Big 5 Personality traits evaluation. Looking
closer to what the questions are actually asking may give us some ideas of why this the case.
The question in the “Big 5” assessment asked students to rate how “critical, inflexible” they
are; the question about roles on the team asked if they liked to play “devil’s advocate”. It is
possible that “devil’s advocate” was perceived by students as a more favourable characteristic
34 Chapter 1. Peer Effects in anMBA Program
than “inflexible or critical”; leading them to be more honest in their answer.9
Table 1.11: Regressions with most common student behaviour during a group discussion as an
outcome (survey data).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explain Lead Devil’s Advo-
cate
Use Work Ask Listen
Adm. GPA 4.72e-05 0.00277 6.60e-05 -0.00111 -0.00166 -0.000408
(0.00171) (0.00172) (0.00157) (0.00164) (0.00129) (0.00155)
GMAT 4.34e-05 -0.000108 0.000649 -0.000631 -2.55e-05 -1.54e-05
(0.000581) (0.000584) (0.000532) (0.000557) (0.000438) (0.000526)
Comm/Econ 0.167 -0.0543 0.147 -0.137 -0.0982 -0.0937
Background (0.120) (0.121) (0.110) (0.115) (0.0905) (0.109)
STEM -0.0251 -0.158 0.279** -0.104 -0.0931 0.0260
Background (0.122) (0.123) (0.112) (0.117) (0.0924) (0.111)
Female -0.292*** 0.00925 -0.00816 0.0566 0.171** 0.0234
(0.0912) (0.0918) (0.0836) (0.0874) (0.0688) (0.0827)
Domestic 0.0771 0.170** -0.0670 -0.244*** 0.0356 -0.139*
Student (0.0832) (0.0838) (0.0763) (0.0798) (0.0628) (0.0754)
Constant 0.376 0.284 -0.290 1.053** 0.309 0.399
(0.429) (0.431) (0.393) (0.411) (0.323) (0.389)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154
R-squared 0.089 0.069 0.080 0.073 0.065 0.046
F test model 2.384 1.804 2.140 1.942 1.707 1.182
Standard errors in parentheses
Data source: survey data. N=154.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To sum up, it appears that peers affect each other’s grades not only through knowledge
transfer but also through establishing a group environment that is conducive to learning. A
high number of argumentative peers, whether or not they are of high ability, has the potential
to decrease students’ grades.
9Unfortunately, since I do not have the survey data for all group members, nor can I make any reasonable
assumptions about distributions of personality characteristics in the class, I am not able to directly and definitively
estimate the effect of the peers who are argumentative and/or enjoy playing “devil’s advocate”. If I limit my
sample to those students for whom I have enough group observations to perform such an analysis, I am left with
25 observations. I did run the regression on these 25 observations, and indeed, the negative effect of STEM peers
disappears if I control for the peers who enjoy playing “devil’s advocate”.
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1.6 Average vs. Individual course Peer Effects
Students’ success in the program is frequently measured by their cumulative GPA, so it comes
as no surprise that research often focuses on the cumulative GPA or another average grade
as the main outcome which peers might influence (e.g. Jain and Kapoor (2015), Carrel et al.
(2013)). The results reported in the previous sections showed that even different components
of the same course are differently influenced by the same peers; thus, it is quite possible that
different courses are affected in different ways. Therefore, focusing the analysis only on the
average grade may miss crucial details. It is common that students may care more about some
courses than others, and one reason for it is that grades in certain courses (often the ones with
quantitative focus) may be requested by potential employers. This lack of motivation will be
reflected both in the individual outcomes as well as the effect of these students on their peers.
The data I collected allows me to compare and contrast the peer effects on two individual
courses. One of them, Managerial Finance, is used for the analysis in the previous sections. The
second course is called Leading People in Organizations (“LPO”) and is focused on developing
student’s leadership and managerial skills. The goal of the course is to introduce students to a
variety of situations a manager may be facing at work and guide them through finding solutions
to these problems. As is probably clear from the description, the course is more qualitative than
quantitative in nature and requires skills that are most likely different from the ones needed
in the Finance course. Thus, it is also expected that we might find different peer effects on
the grades in this course. The total LPO grade is an equally-weighted average of a group
assignment score and a class participation grade. The group assignment is done together with
the learning team.10 I obtained the LPO grades for two cohorts.
Table 1.12 shows the results of regression (1) on the final Managerial Finance grade, LPO
grade and an average of the two - which is used as a proxy for cumulative GPA. For ease
of comparison, I limit the sample to the two cohorts for which I have LPO grades. Previous
sections showed the results for the individual components of the Managerial Finance grade,
and the results are similar for the final Managerial Finance score. To recap, students with
higher admission GPA and GMAT scores do better, female students and non-domestic students
perform worse, and students with a degree in commerce get higher grades than students with
other degrees. There are also some peer effects: negative effects of the high fraction of STEM
peers and peers with top GMAT scores. For the two cohorts, there is also a positive effect from
having peers with top admission GPA scores. LPO grade is positively related to GMAT score;
students with humanities degrees seem to do better. In terms of peer effects, there is only a
slight negative effect of having a high fraction of top GPA peers in the group.
10Recall that the learning team stays the same for all courses in one semester.
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Table 1.12: OLS on the Managerial Finance, LPO and Average grades as outcomes.
(1) (2) (3)
Total MF Total LPO Avg Grade (MF
and LPO)
Admission GPA 0.165*** -0.00883 0.0779*
(0.0582) (0.0429) (0.0404)
GMAT score 0.0296*** 0.00894* 0.0193***
(0.00646) (0.00466) (0.00460)
Degree related to 4.076*** -2.367*** 0.855
commerce/economics (0.866) (0.624) (0.627)
Degree in STEM 1.116 -1.038* 0.0393
(1.006) (0.594) (0.665)
Female -1.532** -0.126 -0.829*
(0.717) (0.468) (0.487)
Domestic Student 1.755** 1.954*** 1.854***
(0.680) (0.513) (0.464)
Fraction of LT Peers with -3.121* -3.513 -3.317*
Commerce/Economics degree (1.656) (2.858) (1.723)
Fraction of LT Peers with -6.319*** -0.194 -3.256*
STEM degree (1.573) (2.904) (1.714)
Fraction if LT peers who are -1.511 1.458 -0.0264
domestic students (1.298) (2.096) (1.379)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom 1.366 -1.131 0.118
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.269) (1.973) (1.369)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 4.628** -3.907 0.361
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (1.738) (2.520) (1.897)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom -1.513 -1.157 -1.335
20% of GMAT distribution (1.770) (1.853) (1.454)
Fraction of LT peers in the top -4.631*** 1.259 -1.686
20% of GMAT distribution (1.447) (1.888) (1.393)
Constant 49.91*** 76.81*** 63.36***
(5.587) (6.436) (4.522)
Observations 280 280 280
R-squared 0.233 0.127 0.141
F test model 8.485 4.312 3.775
Standard errors are clustered at the learning team level.
LT - Learning Team; LPO - Leading People in Organizations; MF - Managerial Finance.
Year and Section fixed effects are included in the regression.
Data source: administrative dataset 2014-2015. N=280.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Now, column 3 in Table 1.12 shows the results of the regression of personal and peer
characteristics on a generated average grade comprised of 50% Finance, 50% LPO grade. First,
note that the coefficients of the characteristics decreased in significance. Because of such
different nature of these courses, it’s likely that different characteristics would matter the most.
It is also possible that different types of students place different levels of importance on these
courses, and therefore exert more or less effort in preparation for the class. Similarly, the
significance and magnitude of peer effects change as well.
This simple observation shows that we may be missing peer effects if we focus only on
the average grade in the program or a semester. This is especially important for programs
where grades for individual courses matter in the future job search. In the case of this MBA
program, a high proportion of students is highly motivated to achieve a high grade in Finance
course, while at the same time, most students do not perceive the LPO course as crucial to
their future career. In addition, since courses (or even separate course components) are graded
differently, this may further muddle the potential peer effects findings if we look at the average
grade. For example, courses with heavy group work components may be subject to the “free-
rider” problem; participation components may be heavily affected by students’ own personality
characteristics as well as instructor’s preferences for cold-calling or picking students with lower
participation grades. The main point is that we might miss the peer effects on the individual
courses if we look at the average GPA, and even if peers matter for one course but not others,
that may give us an opportunity to improve students’ academic performance in some courses
while not affecting the others.
1.7 Conclusion
Peer effects need to be taken into consideration when we divide students into groups, sections,
and classes. Even though this research question has been given considerable attention, it is still
not clear if peer effects exist, how strong and important they are, and why might certain types
of students affect each other. In addition, certain types of professional educational programs,
such as MBA, may provide us with important insights into how peers may affect each other’s
performance not only in an academic setting but also in a work environment. In this paper, I
showed the existence and magnitude of peer effects in small exogenously assigned groups in
an MBA program. I find that students’ grades are affected by their peers, and not all students
are affected equally. Some important peer effects include the negative effect of STEM peers
and the possible positive effect of very low and very high GPA peers. I also find evidence for
heterogeneous peer effects, in particular, the possible benefits of grouping students of similar
ability together. In addition, I document the heterogeneity of peer effects across different com-
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ponents of the same course. Using the unique survey data collected among the three cohorts
of MBA students, I found some potential explanations for these peer effects. First, top GMAT
peers tend to increase the amount of time students spend studying for finance with their learn-
ing team, but it does not translate into higher grades. While exploring potential personality
characteristics reasons for this puzzle, I find that GMAT scores are negatively correlated with
“agreeableness” score. Thus, top GMAT peers might be more confrontational, making them
less desirable as teammates. Second, STEM students are more likely than others to engage
in “devil’s advocate” behaviour, possibly creating a hostile study environment. Finally, using
grades for two vastly different courses, I find that peer effects differ across courses, meaning
that if we focus on an average grade in a program as an outcome, we might falsely conclude
that peer effects do not exist.
Findings of this paper support some of the previous conclusions found in the literature:
people affect each other differently, and a pleasant psychological atmosphere in a group mat-
ters. While students’ cognitive ability might play a role in how good of a peer they might
be, their personality and the way they conduct themselves during the group discussions may
be more important. The heterogeneous peer effects also show us that there should be a way
to allocate students across teams that is beneficial for some, if not all of them. I understand
that the administrations of academic programs may have different objectives in mind when it
comes to dividing students into teams. Currently, the most popular explanation for the assign-
ment rules is creating a diverse environment for students, in which they can communicate and
learn from students from a variety of academic and cultural backgrounds. This goal may be an
important one, and it is difficult to measure how successful these teams are in terms of teaching
students about diversity. However, I would encourage programs to look more seriously into
students’ personality characteristics and their communication styles and making more explicit
rules based on those rather than just observables. To my knowledge, some of such assessments
are often already being done as a part of career services for students; thus, the only thing that
might be required is to incorporate the results of such assessments into the team allocation
process. The findings of this paper may also be used in the workplace when dividing workers
into teams or groups. Similarly to the education setting, employers may need to be mindful of





In the beginning of the program most students diligently study with their assigned learning
teams. There are two reasons for this. First, a vast majority of students arrive at the program
without knowing any other students in their cohort, so the assigned learning team serves as an
initial peer group. Second, students are under the impression that they must study with their
teams because the program requires it, and therefore follow the rules.
The organization of the team meetings varies across teams. There are some students who
follow strict rules that they agreed upon in the beginning of the semester. There are also stu-
dents who follow a more lenient approach and just decide what to do on the spot. During
the team meetings students discuss the cases assigned as well as answer the assigned ques-
tions. They may discuss the models or go through calculations for the subjects that are more
quantitative.
As the time progresses, the team meetings take more of review session form. Students may
divide the assigned material among themselves and then teach the material to their teammates
during the meeting. By the end of the second module (about 2-3 months into the program)
most students do not meet with their teams, or meet very rarely.
The main reason for this as quoted by the students themselves is the intensity of the recruit-
ing process which starts in June and reaches it’s peak in August-September. Due to the high
time demands from the recruiting events and because individual students may have to attend
different recruiting sessions, the scheduling of the team meetings becomes very challenging.
Other reasons for the drop in the learning team meetings frequency is that students start to
study with their friends or other peers who have similar career interests, and that students over-
all stop seeing the benefits from working with their Learning Team. By the end of the summer
most students only meet with learning teams to work on a few mandatory group projects.
Program and Recruiting
In terms of the class grades, students know that every class is “bell curved” with a mean of
80% and a standard deviation of 3-6 (depending on the class). They are also told that the top
25% of students usually get a grade of 82% and higher.
When it comes to the recruiting process, students are roughly (unofficially) divided into the
groups according to their career goals. Most students are interested in either consulting stream
or finance/investment banking stream. Other options may include entrepreneurship, corporate
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governance, HR, marketing or accounting. Because different types of companies have different
types of interviews, students tend to have practice sessions with their peers who are interested
in the same career stream. They may also do some of their other studying with them.
Consulting and Investment Banking firms have certain requirements for students’ grades.
In particular, in order to get an interview in one of these types of companies students need to
be in the top quarter of the class. Some companies need students with an overall GPA in the
top 25%, some others look for specific courses, most often Finance and Data Management and
Analysis courses.
These recruiting rules generate competition among students. When asked whether or not
they care about their class rank, most students say that they at least care whether or not they are
above that cut-off grade of 82%. Some students who are not in these streams still care whether
or not they are in the top half of the class. Only a small percentage of students do not care
about their class rank, these are mostly students in the entrepreneurship stream.
Other peers in the program
Students are required to form their own teams on two occasions: to participate in the McKenzie
case competition and for the consulting project.
Students seem to have two main ways of forming the groups for these projects. Some
students report that they pick students who they are similar with, who they know they like to
work with, with whom they can focus and finish the project fast and efficiently. Other students
like to have a well-rounded team, so they pick students who complement their own abilities,
so, for example a person with expertise in finance, may pick peers with accounting, HR and
marketing experience. Finally, one student reported that he picked his team with a different
goal in mind: he wanted to work with students who he has not worked with before. The reason
for this was to expose himself to various types of people, as this student finds it very useful to
learn how to deal with different types of colleagues in stressful situations.
One curious thing is that none of students indicated that they work with their friends on
these group projects. It appears that in the MBA program students very clearly distinguish
between the friends they socialize with and students they would like to work with. These
two categories overlap, but not perfectly. This fact is also evident from the analysis of the
survey data from 2014, where I also find a lack of overlap between the McKenzie case group
composition and the groups of friends.
When it comes to the daily studying, students either prefer or are indifferent to being as-
signed to a team with various types of students. They do see the benefit in learning how to
operate, lead and follow in a group that consists of people who are not similar to themselves.




Table 1.13: Correlations between personal characteristics








Female 0.08 -0.11 1.00
Domestic Student -0.25 -0.18 0.03 1.00
Degree in Com-
merce/Economics
-0.09 -0.21 0.13 0.11 1.00
Degree in STEM 0.08 0.25 -0.22 -0.20 -0.79 1.00
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Table 1.14: OLS on the MF grades accounting for hours studied









Hours studied for MF by him/herself -0.0281 0.0578 -0.130 -0.0871
(0.129) (0.188) (0.125) (0.186)
Hours studied for MF with LT 0.310 0.198 0.145 0.0982
(0.189) (0.234) (0.229) (0.273)
Adm. GPA 0.159** 0.181* 0.0381 0.0413
(0.0792) (0.0917) (0.0782) (0.0832)
GMAT 0.0306*** 0.0283** 0.0200* 0.0188
(0.0107) (0.0127) (0.0115) (0.0128)
Comm/Econ Background 4.144*** 4.060*** 1.878 2.093
(1.110) (1.237) (1.663) (2.029)
STEM Background 0.147 0.776 1.199 1.752
(1.135) (1.295) (1.490) (1.658)
Female -1.137 -1.049 -1.472 -1.475
(0.912) (0.935) (1.080) (1.040)
Canadian or PR 1.694 1.774 0.374 0.180
(1.057) (1.123) (0.990) (1.078)
Fraction of LT Peers with -8.024 -0.851
Commerce/Economics degree (5.079) (5.153)
Fraction of LT Peers with -4.272 0.929
STEM degree (3.705) (4.761)
Fraction of LT peers who are 0.394 -1.696
Domestic Students (3.024) (3.388)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom -0.851 -0.492
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (2.485) (3.064)
Fraction of LT peers in the bottom -2.066 -0.144
20% of GMAT distribution (2.288) (3.090)
Fraction of LT peers in the top -1.452 -0.662
20% of Adm. GPA distribution (2.900) (4.039)
Fraction of LT peers in the top 2.172 1.438
20% of GMAT distribution (2.267) (2.831)
Constant 44.98*** 50.30*** 63.42*** 64.98***
(9.201) (12.24) (8.892) (11.72)
Observations 185 176 185 176
R-squared 0.156 0.177 0.047 0.051
F test model 5.103 3.189 1.719 1.144
P-value of F model 3.36e-05 0.000494 0.103 0.337
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
LT - Learning Team
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Chapter 2
Testing team allocation rules
2.1 Introduction
Almost all academic settings require students to be divided into groups: sections, classes, tuto-
rials, study groups, or project teams. Often this assignment is done randomly (e.g., class/tutorial
sections) or by students choosing their group (e.g., class project team). However, in many
programs, little consideration is given to how students might affect each other’s academic out-
comes. In the previous chapter, I showed that in the context of an MBA program where students
are assigned to small study groups, peer effects exist, and some are significant. Moreover, some
of these peer effects are heterogeneous across different types of students. Most prominently,
students with different admission GPA scores are positively affected when grouped with peers
of similar ability levels. Male and female students, domestic and international students and
students with different academic backgrounds are also affected differently by different peers.
An important question then is whether we can improve students’ academic outcomes by strate-
gically allocating them to groups with peers who are projected to have a positive influence on
student’s academic outcomes.
In this chapter, I use data from a leading Canadian MBA program where students are allo-
cated to small learning teams by the administration - the same dataset used in Chapter 1. The
main outcome of interest is a grade in a Managerial Finance class. This class is one of the core
components of the program and runs in the first semester. Managerial finance is a required
course, and students tend to take it seriously because many prospective employers request the
grades in this course as a part of an application package.
One of the major benefits of using data from an MBA program is that it is designed to
simulate workplace interactions. Students are asked to analyze “cases” in small teams, and they
are strongly encouraged to deal with any conflicts or issues by themselves. Also, MBA students
tend to have work experience, and most of them are going back into the corporate world after
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the program. Thus, the findings of this research could potentially be applied not only in an
academic setting but also to improve the formation of teams and improve productivity in the
workplace.
In this paper, I answer the question of whether there is a way to allocate students across
teams in a manner that would benefit (or at least not hurt) all students. I take as given the
peer effects found in the previous paper, and I run a variety of simulations, modifying the way
students are allocated across teams. I calculate the projected grades and compare them with
realized grades to see whether there might be an improvement.
Because of the complicated and heterogeneous nature of peer effects and because each
student possesses more than one characteristic, I adjust the estimation of peer effects to include
a number of cross-terms that appeared significant in previous findings. I then use the estimated
results in the simulations to create the distributions of grades under different allocation rules.
The proposed ways of dividing students across teams are mainly motivated by the findings of
my previous paper and the existing allocation rules that the program uses. To compare the
results, I calculate the mean, standard deviation and also visually assess the distributions of the
grades. To ensure that any increase in average grade does not come from increasing grades for
one subgroup of students at the expense of another, I report the simulated and realized grades
for each subgroup of students.
For the purposes of this paper, student achievement is measured by their grades in the Man-
agerial Finance course. The main finding is that homogeneous within-group assignment rules
are optimal. As expected, dividing students into teams based on their admission GPA (creating
homogeneous groups) results in an increase in the average grade. In addition, separating male
and female students and international and domestic students also results in an increase in aver-
age grades in finance class. It also appears that almost all types of students benefit from more
homogeneous group assignments and no students experience detrimental effects from these
types of assignment rules. In Chapter 1, I suggest that one of the mechanisms behind the peer
effects could be the way different types of students shape the psychological atmosphere in the
group. In this case, more homogeneous groups may have a more comfortable discussion envi-
ronment for students, allowing them to contribute their ideas, ask questions without worrying
about their peers. Note that it does not mean that peers of certain backgrounds actually behave
negatively towards other students, but rather that if a student perceives her peers to be smarter,
more knowledgeable, more confident than her, it may affect the way this student behaves in the
team, and thus affect her learning and performance.
According to the administration of the business school, one of the reasons for heteroge-
neous group assignment rules is to expose students to a variety of peers, which will allow them
to learn how to interact with colleagues in the increasingly diverse corporate environments.
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Therefore, maximization of the current grades may not be the main objective of the MBA
program, and there may be other long-term benefits of grouping different students together.
However, given that the grade performance in class (in particular finance and other specializa-
tion classes) is often used as one of the hiring criteria, I argue that students should be given an
opportunity to achieve the best results they can. The goal of learning through interaction with
various peers could be achieved in other, less technical classes or through participation in case
competitions and other extracurricular activities.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes a selection of relevant litera-
ture. Section 3 discusses at length the data used for this paper; Section 4 describes the methods
and procedures I used in running the simulations. Section 5 shows the results and provides
some discussion of possible policy changes. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The question of efficient allocation of students across teams arises naturally in any research
paper that looks at peer effects in education. Chapter 1 provides a more detailed literature
review of papers related to the research on peer effects in an MBA program. Below I present a
few papers that attempt to either form groups in the quasi-experimental setting or calculate the
predicted outcomes given their findings on peer effects.
One of the well-known works on the subject, Carell et al. (2013), uses their findings re-
garding peer effects in Air Force Academy to create sections of cadets. The authors’ goal was
to capture the positive effect of high ability peers on lower ability peers by grouping them to-
gether. They find, however, that in the experimental sections, these effects did not realize. The
authors posit that this may be because students form subgroups within the sections, befriending
peers of similar ability, thus eliminating the possible positive spillovers from interactions with
higher ability peers. Due to the small size of the groups in the MBA program used in my re-
search, the issue of forming subgroups should not be critical. Thus, running even a simulation
exercise should show the improvements in the outcomes depending on the group composition.
Booij et al. (2015) use data from an experiment where they manipulate the composition of tuto-
rial groups according to students’ ability levels. They find that low ability students benefit from
being in the groups with similar level students, while high ability students are not affected by
the switch from the mixed ability to similar ability groups. They also indicate that lower ability
students tend to be more involved in the study process in the tracked groups. These findings
echo the results of Chapter 1, which showed that students benefit from being grouped in teams
with similar ability peers. Similarly, another paper on peer effects, Feld and Zölitz (2017) dis-
covers that peer effects appear to be channelled through the changes in group interaction rather
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than teacher’s effort, for example. Authors find that in a German university, where students
are divided into sections of 16 students each, students allocated to sections with high ability
students benefit. However, they note that this effect is heterogeneous. Low ability students are
harmed by high ability peers, while high ability peers benefit from being grouped. Overall,
based on the previous research, it appears that homogeneous team allocations may result in
better outcomes for students. However, observable characteristics of students are often corre-
lated, and a composite effect of a group member that possesses a number of characteristics is
not clear. Therefore, it is interesting to run a simulation and see how different allocation rules
will affect grades.
Aside from the academic context, teams are extensively used in a variety of workplaces:
governments, consulting agencies, research centres, and virtually any other private sector es-
tablishment. As previously mentioned, using the data from an MBA program provides us with
insights into how teams might operate not only in the education settings but also in the work-
place. Peer effects have been established in previous research on teams at the workplace (Chan
et al. (2013), Bandiera et al. (2013), Mas and Moretti (2009)), although there is still no unan-
imous conclusion about the existence and importance of peer effects (Guryan et al. (2009)).
We may not be able to apply all the lessons learned from the MBA program directly to the
workplace. However, since the MBA program is designed to mimic a workplace, and MBA
students tend to be more mature, with some work experience, this research still might provide
some insights into better ways of assigning teams in a variety of work environments.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Program and Course Description
The dataset used in this paper is constructed using demographic and administrative admission
data from an MBA program at a leading Canadian university and the results of a survey of
MBA students. The MBA program lasts one year, and each year it admits approximately 120
students. Administrators divide students into two sections, and students in each section take all
the classes together. Professors teaching in two sections generally differ; however, the syllabus
and the material covered is the same. The data cover six cohorts of students who entered the
program in 2011-2016. The data are available for one section for the year 2011 and for both
sections for 2012-2016, which results in a total of 611 observations.
The administrative data on the students of the MBA program include students demographic
and academic background characteristics, such as gender, cumulative GPA from the previous
degree (“Admission GPA”), GMAT score, previous degree major, number of months of work
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Female 33.9% 28.3% 22.9% 31.2% 26.8% 26.8%
Commerce Degree 41.3% 46.5% 46.7% 39.8% 47.8% 54.5%
STEM Degree 42.8% 43.3% 42.6% 51.61% 39.1% 36.5%
Canadian Students 68.3% 68.5% 71.3% 68.8% 73.9 % 73.6%
Admission GPA 76.4 77 77.33 77.6 77.29 77.16
GMAT 669 667 660 655 656 665
Number of observations 62 127 122 93 138 145
experience and the industry in which the work experience has been acquired, mother tongue
and immigration status. Approximately a third of the students are female, and about 70%
of students are Canadian citizens. Just under 20% are international students, and the rest are
Permanent Residents. Students come from a variety of academic backgrounds: 40% of students
have a business or economics-related degree; a significant portion (about 30%) have a STEM
(mostly engineering or hard science) background; the rest have humanities or social science
(other than economics) degrees. The average GPA grade from their previous degree is 77%,
and the average GMAT score is 660 (out of 800) points. The summary statistics are presented
in Table 2.1. In addition, I collect information on students’ assigned learning teams and the
grade in the Managerial Finance course, which I use as a main academic outcome.
Managerial Finance is an introductory finance course in which students learn basic corpo-
rate finance concepts, such as capital structure, asset pricing, interest rate calculation etc. The
main teaching method employed for virtually all classes in the MBA program is teaching with
the use of cases. A case describes a real or hypothetical firm which is facing a finance-related
problem and needs to make a decision. Students are asked to perform an analysis of a situation
and present potential solutions to the problem. The case is taken up in class, and all students
are expected to participate in the discussion and offer their suggestions. Managerial Finance
is a required course for all students in the program, and it runs in the first semester. Using the
first-semester course ensures that students are most likely to engage with their teams since they
have not had a chance to form meaningful connections outside of their group or a class yet.1
The final grade for the Managerial Finance course consists of the weighted average grade for
the written assignments (midterm test and final exam), and the class contribution grade. While
there is no explicit group component in the class, students are expected to work with their
assigned learning teams to prepare for lectures and exams. A general format for the midterm
is short answer questions: some questions test the knowledge of terms and definitions used in
class, and some require calculations. The final exam, on the other hand, consists of an analysis
1This is confirmed by the students who were interviewed.
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of a case study. It requires students to read a case describing a problem that a company is
facing, provide a detailed analysis of the issues and make a recommendation. The class contri-
bution is recorded in every class by a Teaching Assistant.2 Students are given a grade of 3 for
a significant, meaningful contribution; grade of 2 for an average insight; and a grade of 1 for
a quick comment or a definition. Students may have multiple contributions per class, although
the instructor somewhat mediates it: he may cold-call on a student with a low contribution
level or pick a student with less contribution over the one with a high contribution if there are
several students willing to answer a question. The final grades are bell-curved with a mean of
80% and a standard deviation of 7. Students are told in advance about the bell-curving process.
I divide students into three groups according to their previous degrees: commerce/economics,
STEM and others, which includes mostly students with arts and humanities degrees, as well
as a handful of students with a degree in social sciences other than Economics. There are two
reasons for this separation. First and foremost, these are the main educational background cat-
egories used to allocate students across groups. Second, since the outcome is a grade in an
introductory finance class, students with Commerce degrees may already be familiar with con-
cepts covered in class. Also, due to the quantitative nature of finance, I believe that students
with Engineering or hard science backgrounds should be able to master the concepts faster
than students who may need a refresher in math. This assumption is supported by the fact that
students with STEM backgrounds tend to have higher grades in the Managerial Finance course
than other students.
2.3.2 Learning Teams
After being divided into sections, students are assigned to learning teams by the administrative
staff. The main criteria used in team assignment (in order of importance) are as follows: gender,
previous degree major, work experience, immigration status, mother tongue.
The strictest requirement is the gender one. Based on the student experience from previous
years, program administration reports that having two women per group results in the best
student experience, especially for female students. Given the small number of female students
in the program, each year there are some groups with no women.3 While the rest of the criteria
are important, the data suggests that there is a variation in the number of STEM major students
or the number of international students across groups. The reason for these allocation rules
is to ensure fairness and to create a diverse and safe environment. The main purpose of the
2Starting from 2015 the instructor records the contribution grade
3Due to some students dropping out of the program, there are some teams with only one female student.
Especially in 2015, four students dropped out of the program, and three were female. The dropouts usually
happen very early in the semester, and this should not be disruptive to student’s work.
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learning team is to study and prepare for the various classes as a group, as well as complete
group assignments for some of the courses.
Students are typically not allowed to switch their teams. If a conflict arises, students are
expected to seek advice from their program coordinator and resolve the conflict. Only in the
most extreme cases will the student be allowed to switch the team. According to the program
coordinator, no such situation occurred within the last few years. Thus, students themselves
have no input on how the learning teams are assigned.
During interviews with some of the students, I discovered that students are mostly working
with their assigned teams at the beginning of the program. As time progresses, students get
to know more of their peers in the program, and they also get much busier (e.g. employment
information sessions, interviews, and networking events start near the end of the first semester).
Because of this, students spend less time with their team and more time studying alone or with
other friends. However, because I focus on the courses that run in the first semester, I believe
that I capture any effects group mates have on each other.
Finally, students have a fixed, assigned seating in the classroom: students sit surrounded by
their learning team members. Thus, if any peer effects arise from the proximity of seating in a
classroom, these effects will still come mostly from the learning team members.
Students are encouraged by the program administration and by the instructors to spend time
studying with their learning teams. Each team is assigned a faculty mentor, whose role is to
provide guidance as well as to aid in any conflict resolution. There are special meeting rooms
reserved for each team for the semester. During the team meetings, students discuss the cases:
using the framework they learned in class, they discuss the main issues, thoroughly analyze the
case and propose solutions. Each team may have its own style, but the goal is to get ready for
the case discussion in class. Occasionally, instructors will give teams specific assignments, for
example, to argue for or against a certain case point, so teams have to prepare their arguments
and present their points in class.
There are some complicated interactions students may have with their learning team peers.
First of all, there may be a direct knowledge transfer. For example, students with a commerce
background may be quite familiar with most of the technical material covered in class and
may be able to explain it to the teammates who are falling behind. Second, students may
be affected by the interactions during team discussions. A positive, cooperative discussion
may lead to a better understanding of the material. Since case analysis is a major component
of Managerial Finance grade (class participation and final exam are based solely on the case
discussion), students’ interactions with peers during the team meetings play a crucial role in
their preparedness for class. In Chapter 1, I find that one of the important channels is the
psychological atmosphere in the group, which may be achieved by grouping similar students
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together.
2.3.3 Role of the Business School
The goal of business schools is not just to provide students with knowledge but also to introduce
them to the way a workplace operates and give them an opportunity to practice their networking
and interpersonal skills. This additional goal brings complexity to the analysis of peer effects
in the context of the MBA program. On the one hand, the current team allocation rules are
put in place to mimic the diverse environment of a modern workplace. The current motivation
for diverse learning teams is based on some branches of management literature which find that
diverse teams are beneficial for the work and productivity of teams (Williams and O’Reilly
(1998), van Knippenberg et al. (2013)). On the other hand, this allocation may potentially be
detrimental to students’ knowledge accumulation since students benefit from being grouped
with similar peers, according to the findings of Chapter 1. The knowledge students get in their
courses is important since they will need it to be able to contribute to their future workplace,
and grades are often requested by the employers during the hiring process.4
It is up to business schools’ administration to determine which goal takes priority. It is also
important to note that peer effects do not fully determine a student’s grade; they simply may
affect it. In the sections that follow, I attempt to find an allocation rule that would incorporate
both - peer effects and the considerations of the group.
2.4 Procedure
The necessary condition for the existence of a Pareto-improving allocation is that peer effects
are not linear-in-means. Otherwise, shuffling students across units will simply result in the
improvement of grades for some at the expense of others. In Chapter 1, I find that peer effects
are heterogeneous across a variety of students’ characteristics: ability, previous undergraduate
degree, gender and immigration status. Since each student possesses more than one of these
characteristics and thus may have competing or enhancing peer effects, I estimate the peer
effects using a number of relevant cross-terms.
The first step was to get the appropriate coefficients to use in the simulation. To acquire
these coefficients, I ran a regression on the written component of managerial finance class
grade among the original sample of MBA students. Since the previous paper established the
heterogeneous nature of peer effects among MBA students, I specify a regression equation that
4According to students, certain employers and industries, such as finance or consulting, will not even consider
an application from a student whose grade is lower than a specified cut-off.
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accounts for all appropriate cross-terms. It is important to keep in mind, though, that the full
set of cross-terms is quite large, and the sample size consists of 611 observations. Thus, to
improve the estimation precision, I re-estimate the equation including only the cross-terms that
were shown to be important to various groups of students in the previous chapter.
To be precise, I run the following regression:
yi = α1 + α2Xi + α3X̄−i + α3Xi × X̄−i + Year × S ection + εi (2.1)
Where yi is a grade (written component) in Managerial Finance course, Xi is a collection of
personal demographic and educational characteristics and X̄−i j is a collection of learning team
peer characteristics. The peer characteristics are defined as the average value for the student’s
learning team peers, not including the student herself. For example, for a student who has a
science degree and is a member of a six-person team that has two other science graduates, the
value of the fraction of peers with a STEM degree will be 0.4.5 In order to control for peers’
ability levels, I generate four variables: a fraction of learning team peers in the top 20% of
class admission GPA distribution, a fraction of learning team peers in the bottom 20% of class
admission GPA distribution, and two variables of the fraction of learning team peers in the top
and bottom 20% of class GMAT distribution.6 To control for the potential differences across
cohorts and instructors, I include Year X S ection fixed effects in the regression.
As discussed above, I also control for a variety of cross-terms to account for the heteroge-
neous effects of peers on different types of students. I focus on the interactions that have been
shown to be significant in predicting grades in the previous chapter. I re-estimate the regression
above to account for these cross-terms, collect the coefficients and use them in the simulations
below.
I create ten rules motivated by my previous findings and existing program rules. Since
students are assigned to teams based on certain observable characteristics, I want to see how
modifying these rules might affect the grades.
• Rule 1: The first intuitive way of allocating students is to draw six students for each
group randomly. I repeat this exercise 100 times and calculate the statistics described
above.
Given that I find heterogeneous peer effects across different types of students, the next
5I control for peers’ educational background and their ability levels. I tested a variety of specifications, in-
cluding own and peers’ work experience, language and immigration status. These variables do not influence the
results, and thus I omit them in the final specification.
6Note that the top and bottom 20% for both ability measures are defined on the class level, rather than the
overall sample or the percentile results of the GMAT. I.e. given the distribution of the scores in the incoming
class, I calculate what fraction of student’s learning team peers are in the top or bottom 20%
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several ways of team allocation account for these heterogeneities. From chapter 1, I know
that students who are assigned to the groups with peers of a similar admission GPA perform
better in the Finance class. Thus, I expect that rules that create such groups should create
higher average predicted grades. Note that GMAT score and immigration status are correlated
with admission GPA. Domestic students tend to have lower admission GPA due to the higher
competition among international students and overall selection into the MBA program. It is not
clear from the previous findings how the rules based on other characteristics, such as gender or
undergraduate degree, would perform. Thus, I test the following group allocation methods:
• Rule 2: Group students by admission GPA, keeping them as homogeneous in terms of
GPA as possible.
• Rule 3: Group students by GMAT scores, keeping them as homogeneous in terms of
GMAT as possible.
• Rule 4: Group students by gender: separating male and female students.
• Rule 5 and 6: Create heterogeneous teams in terms of admission GPA or GMAT, putting
together students with the lowest and highest scores.
• Rule 7: Create groups by undergraduate degree.
• Rule 8: Create groups sorted by immigration status.
Because the number of students in each category is not necessarily divisible by six, there will
be one or two mixed groups for each rule, but it should not have a great effect on the average
outcome.
The current set of rules that is in place in the program is based on administrators’ experi-
ence and their goal of “evening out the playing field” for the students and improve students’
experience. While it may not explicitly take into consideration the peer effects, there is still
merit to how these teams are assigned. The process is done partially by the computer, but
partially by hand, with administrators looking over the teams and evening out the number of
female students, ensuring that no teams consist of students with the same degrees or only in-
ternational students. Thus, the next set of rules takes as given the current allocation of students
across teams but tweaks it in small ways.
• Rule 9: Switch one randomly selected person in a team for another randomly selected
student from a different team. Similar to the random group allocation, but taking existing
groups as a base.
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• Rule 10: Order teams in terms of average admission GPA. Take the lowest GPA team and
the highest GPA team, and switch the second top student in the high GPA team with the
bottom student from the low GPA team, repeat with the rest of the teams. This method
should result in evening out the average team GPA, again taking the existing groups as a
baseline.
2.5 Results and Discussion
Since I have already established the existence of peer effects and showed that these effects are
heterogeneous across groups in chapter 1, I was expecting to be able to find students’ allocation
rules that would improve the finance grades. However, because the effect of any given student
is not one-dimensional, finding the best group allocation is not a trivial process. For example,
I previously found that peers with STEM degrees may have a negative effect on their peers, but
I also found that peers with high admission GPAs may have a positive effect on the grade. So,
if a STEM student also has a high admission GPA, that may reduce the negative peer degree
effect.
One of the most prominent results in the previous chapter is that students with similar levels
of admission GPA benefit from being grouped. So any team allocation that involved splitting
students by GPA or by some correlated measure should improve students’ grades.
Once again, I compare the grade distributions on two metrics: mean and standard devia-
tion. In Tables 2.4-2.5 I also present the histograms for the visual representation of the grade
distribution. Since personal characteristics play the most important role in grade formation,
modifying group composition only changes the grade marginally, but it is important to keep
in mind that for the given grade distribution change in the mean of 1% constitutes a change
statistically significant at 1% significance level. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the results of the
simulations.
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The first rule - random assignment of students to teams - results in similar grades as the
actual sample. However, the average grades of most groups of students decrease - only inter-
national students, students with social science and humanities degrees, students in the bottom
and top terciles of GPA distributions see an (insignificant) increase in their finance grades.
This finding is interesting because it appears that the current rules for group selection are not
an improvement on a random assignment of students across teams.
One of the common questions in the economics of education literature is whether or not
separating students by ability level helps them achieve better results. On the flip side, does
pairing strong and weak students together have the potential to improve weak students’ grades
while not negatively affecting strong students’ outcomes? To address these questions, I test
several ability-based group assignments: by admission GPA and by the GMAT scores. First, I
created groups that are homogeneous in terms of ability (measured by GPA or GMAT). Second,
I created groups where top students were paired with bottom students in such a way that the
student with the highest GPA was in the group with the student with the lowest GPA, the student
with second-highest GPA was in the team with the student with second-lowest GPA etc.
Separating students by GPA has a positive effect on the finance grades for all students.
Students in all GPA terciles see an increase in their grades, with top GPA students benefiting
the most (average increase of 9%), followed by the bottom GPA students with a 4% average
increase in grades. I have previously shown that students benefit from having peers of similar
ability present in their teams. Therefore, this finding is not surprising but important nonethe-
less. Splitting students into teams by pairing top students with bottoms students also results in
a slightly higher average grade. However, the increase is much smaller, and the standard errors
are much higher in this scenario. Thus, it appears that splitting students by GPA might be a
better way of allocating students across teams.
It is often assumed that GMAT scores are highly correlated with students’ GPA. However,
in the data used in this paper, this correlation is quite modest at 0.19 (see Table 2.6 for corre-
lations between characteristics). There could be a few reasons for this low correlation. Since
students take the GMAT after already realizing their undergraduate GPA, the weaker students
may spend more time preparing for the test to improve their chances of getting into a prestigious
program. Additionally, students with STEM degrees receive higher GMAT scores. However,
students with these backgrounds may come into the program with a lower undergraduate GPA.
When it comes to team assignment rules, grouping students by GMAT performs slightly better
than the benchmark; however, the average grade of top GMAT students drops. Mixing GMAT
scores in the team result in similar outcomes. Thus, the GMAT score is probably not the best
tool to take into consideration when assigning students to teams.
Aside from ability, a common question is whether separating students by sex would re-
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sult in improvement in outcomes. Under the assignment rule by sex, the average grade is
increased. In particular, though, female students benefit slightly more than male students from
this assignment. In the programs with many international students, it is important to look at the
distribution of domestic vs. international students in the groups. When I test the homogeneous
assignments by immigration status, I find that again, both types of students benefit from it, but
International students see a higher increase in average Managerial Finance grade. Note, how-
ever, that there is a positive correlation between the international student status and admission
GPA; thus, the gains in the average grade could be attributed to the effects of sorting students
by GPA.
So, interestingly, it is the students who may be perceived as vulnerable in a male-dominated,
Canadian commerce program benefit from the homogeneous group assignment: female stu-
dents, international students and lower ability (lower admission GPA) students. In chapter 1,
I suggest that students perform better if they are comfortable in their teams, and they may
feel more comfortable in teams with similar students. Thus, the results from various homo-
geneous rules assignments again support the idea that grouping students by certain observable
characteristics may be beneficial to them.
For the final group of students’ assignment rules, I take the actual teams as given and
introduce some minor tweaks. First, I took one random student from each team and placed
them in a different team. The results are similar to those from the random student assignment
to groups, with a very modest increase of an average grade. The second rule I test uses the
following procedure. I order teams in terms of the average student admission GPA. Then, I
take the team with the highest average admission GPA and pick the student with the second-
highest GPA. I also take the team with the lowest average GPA and pick the student with the
lowest admission GPA in that group. Then I switch these students I picked. I want to test if
“evening out” the average admission GPA would help all students. However, what I find is that
the average finance grade decreases, and interestingly, the bottom admission GPA students now
get slightly lower grades. Again, this shows that there might be a benefit in grouping students
by ability.
Thus, after performing a number of different simulations, the main conclusion is that group-
ing students by the ability level (measured by their undergraduate GPA score) might provide
the best way of allocating students. This finding echoes conclusions from previous research
papers on the subject that also find that allocating similar students to the same groups results
in better outcomes (Hoxby (2005), Carrell et al. (2013)).
One note of these findings is that students’ grades are bell-curved. Thus, any improvement
we see in these simulations would not be translated into an increase in final grades - de facto,
the average will always be 80%. However, if we assume that the grades show improvement in
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Table 2.4: Histograms of the simulated grades. Blue, thin, solid line - real average. Red, thick,
dashed line - average simulated grade
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Table 2.5: Histograms of the simulated grades. Blue line - real average. Red line - average
simulated grade
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knowledge and understanding of the subject, then we can say that shifting to more homoge-
neous groups may improve students’ understanding of the course.
As noted in the introduction, the goal of the MBA program is to prepare students for work-
ing in a modern, diverse environment. The focus on diversity is based on the branch of man-
agement literature, that finds that diverse teams perform better in the work environment. The
program of interest in this paper has certain policies in place that encourage students to learn
how to deal with conflict and resolve issues that arise when working in teams. For example,
students are not allowed to switch teams. In case of a conflict, they are asked to resolve it, and
if there are further issues, to seek council with faculty mentor or administration of the program.
It is difficult to estimate the long-term effects of these lessons, and it is possible that those are
important for developing students’ soft skills. However, again, I argue that students’ level of
knowledge on the subject is also important in their future careers, and the evidence suggests
that peers may have an effect on the level of knowledge (as measured by the simulated grades).
Thus, being mindful of how peers affect each other’s academic outcomes is crucial in assigning
students across teams, and there needs to be a balance between creating a positive academic
learning environment and creating opportunities for students to practice their teamwork and
conflict resolution skills.
I do foresee that separating students by their GPA or any other characteristic may not be a
popular policy among the program administrators, as on the surface, it appears to favour top
students. Recall that fairness is the main criterion of any allocation process. However, I suggest
that program administration can treat bottom GPA students as another criterion group, making
it necessary to group 2 or 3 bottom GPA peers in a group. This assignment process would be
similar to what I present above as a “heterogeneous GPA” assignment rule, which still results
in higher grades for all students. Thus, the low GPA students will have a “buddy” they can
study with, capturing the positive effect of being in a group with similar ability students. At
the same time, this will also allow top GPA students to be grouped with similar peers. Another
fringe benefit of such allocation will be the likely pairing of top GMAT students with top
GPA peers. Recall that top GMAT students have a negative effect on all types of peers, but
allocating them to groups with stronger peers will “level the playing field” for the lower ability
MBA candidates. Alternatively, or in addition to this, administrators may want to design a
workshop, teaching students how to operate in diverse environment, providing them with tools
for effective communication. They may focus both on reminding students to be respectful,
but also to encourage students to speak up and participate even if they may feel somewhat
uncomfortable. This method has the potential to improve the team study process and, as a
result, improve all students’ performance.
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2.6 Conclusion
Allocating students to groups is often done either randomly or according to a set of rules that
appear “fair”. However, very little is done to confirm that these rules are indeed beneficial
to the student or if there is any other way to put students into groups that would result in an
enhanced experience. Using a novel dataset from a Canadian MBA program where students
are administratively allocated to small teams, I tested a variety of potential allocation rules.
I take the coefficients from an OLS regression on the actual finance grades and apply them
to the sample of students who have been allocated to teams in new ways. I account for the
heterogeneity of peer effects by including several cross-terms in the regression.
While most rules do not result in a significant change of the average Managerial Finance
grade, there are some that stand out. Most of all, students benefit from being assigned to the
teams with peers of similar ability levels when the ability level is measured by the admission
GPA. Interestingly, grouping students by GMAT scores does not result in the same grade im-
provement. This presents an interesting challenge for future research, as more work needs to
be done to pin down the exact mechanism of these peer effects.
I suggest that perhaps the best way to allocate students to teams would be to make sure that
there are at least 2-3 students from the bottom 20% of the GPA distribution in a team. This
rule would give the bottom GPA students similar peers and simultaneously benefit the top GPA
students as well.
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2.7 Appendix
Table 2.6: Correlations between personal characteristics








Female 0.08 -0.11 1.00
Domestic Student -0.25 -0.18 0.03 1.00
Degree in Com-
merce/Economics
-0.09 -0.21 0.13 0.11 1.00
Degree in STEM 0.08 0.25 -0.22 -0.20 -0.79 1.00
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Chapter 3
Comparison of the Two Methods of Social
Network Data Collection
3.1 Introduction
The research on peer effect often requires collecting data on peer groups and social networks.
Sometimes, peer groups are exogenously assigned, such as in the MBA program setting used in
the previous two chapters. In other cases, a researcher must collect appropriate data describing
the social network of the participants, which then can be used to analyze the potential peer
effects. There are two main ways of collecting social network data: use of recollection or
recognition questions. A recollection question asks participants to list the names of their friends
(with or without a limit on the number of friends mentioned). A recognition question asks them
to pick names of friends (or colleagues, connections, people they socialize with) from a given
list. While in certain situations, a time limit or research ethics concerns dictate the use of one
or another question, often a researcher has a choice.
There are some intuitive ways of comparing these two methods; for example, a recognition
question is likely to result in more links being mentioned than a recollection question (pro-
vided a sufficient roster size), and a recollection question will probably result in less random
errors and respondents identifying their “better” friends. 1 Often, the answers of two people
responding to the survey do not align: person A may indicate person B as a connection, but
person B does not include person A in their response. Researchers usually make one of two
assumptions to deal with these discordant answers. Underreporting assumes that respondents
may forget the link, but if they do indicate it, then the link is truly there. Overreporting as-
sumes that the respondent may indicate the link that is not truly there, and thus only the links
1Because the respondents are actively writing down the names, they are more likely to indicate real links and
also are more likely to remember the names of those peers with whom they have a stronger connection.
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which are reported by both parties should be included in the network. However, there may be
useful information in these discordant answers, and using it may allow us to estimate a correct
network.
Researchers pick one method of network data collection over the other largely on an ad
hoc basis. This paper, however, provides insight into how these questions compare by directly
contrasting the resulting networks, investigating potential sources of reporting errors and by
analyzing the discordant answers. In the first part of the paper, I present the description of the
network data collected by the recollection and recognition methods among the MBA students.
I then perform checks on the accuracy of the data, investigate the sources of potential errors in
reporting, and suggest some way of checking the validity of the answers by using other survey
questions. In the second part of the paper, I adopt the methodology described in Comola and
Fafchamps (2017) and use the discordant answers to estimate the probability of the reporting
errors as well as the proportion of true links in the networks. I then use this measure to directly
compare the accuracy of the network data collected by each of the two questions.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Network data collection methods
To my knowledge, no paper in the economics literature performs a direct comparison of recol-
lection and recognition questions, and there is a limited number of research papers in sociology
that look at these two methods. Most of the sociology literature on comparing the recall and
recognition methods of social network data collection focuses on documenting the resulting
networks’ differences. A related branch of literature investigates the problem of “forgetting”
some of the ties when using the recall method. It uses recognition as a tool to check how
many peers were forgotten, under the assumption that recognition question results in a correct
network. Brewer (2000) provides a good survey of papers on the subject, focusing mostly on
the issue of forgetting. However, since it is closely related to the measurement issue, a few
papers in his review apply to the broader question of network measurement. He concludes that
forgetting of peers in a free recall question provides a significant source of measurement error.
Hlebec (1993) runs an experiment among 12 members and advisors of the University of
Ljubljana’s student government. She collects the social network data during an interview by
asking students to name peers they talk to most often, go to for advice and who comes to them
for advice. Then she presented participants with a roster and asked them to answer the same
questions but now picking peers from a list. She compared the results according to the size
of the network and the stability of naming. She showed that both methods result in a similar
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network, but the recognition question gives a larger number of ties for the question “whom
do you talk to most often”. Brewer and Webster (1999), in their study of 127 students in a
residence of an Australian university, first ask students to name peers they talk to and then to
ask them to pick names from a roster. They compare the responses and find that students forget
to name 20% of their peers on average. Ferligoj and Hlebec (1999) evaluate ways of collecting
data on a social support network. Their study collected social support relationship data among
third-year students in a high school in Ljubljana using recognition and recollection questions.
In the recognition question, respondents were presented with a list of all students and were
asked to indicate their connections and estimate the strength of each link. In the recollection
question, respondents were asked to name their friends. The results show that the recognition
question resulted in a higher number and weaker ties than the recollection question.
There is very little research that focuses on comparing these methods in terms of the re-
sulting network’s accuracy. Brewer (2000) quotes two of these. Bernard et al. (1982) take
the records of e-mail messages between 57 scientists. The participants were interviewed peri-
odically over five months and asked with whom they correspond via e-mail. Their responses
were compared to the e-mail records, and the authors found that 66% of communications were
forgotten. In a different study, Freeman et al. (1987) observed university seminar series par-
ticipants. When these participants were asked to name who was present at a colloquium a few
days after each session, many were forgotten (exact number not specified). Both of these stud-
ies ask respondents to recall potentially minor interactions that occurred over a considerable
time. The prevalence of forgotten links is not surprising in this case.
To sum up, the sociology literature concludes that any social network data collection method
will result in a flawed network. However, it is interesting to quantify the errors in these net-
works and use that measure to compare the two ways of network data collection.
3.2.2 Missing links and discordant answers
While in some cases it may be enough to have knowledge of the characteristics of a subset of
person’s peers, in other situations, the knowledge of true network is important. For example,
Conley, Mehta, Stinebrickner, and Stinebrickner (2018) show that students may be affected by
peers who they are not directly connected to, highlighting the importance of understanding of
social networks for peer effects research. The standard approach to the network data analysis
in the literature is to use either the report of the link by one of the people or by a combination
of the two reports (Conley and Udry (2010), Stinebrickner et al. (2010)). Depending on the
nature of the social network, researchers may use the maximum or the minimum report. There
is usually a non-trivial proportion of discordant answers when one respondent reports a link
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while their counterpart does not (Fafchamps and Lund; Bramoulle et al. 2009). For example,
in the dataset studied in this paper, the proportion of the discordant links varies depending on
the survey question, but, on average, around 60% of the reported links are discordant. While
researchers incorporate the discordant answers in their analysis by making certain assumptions,
the fact that the answers are discordant is usually not used. Comola and Fafchamps (2017)
propose an estimator that takes into account the discordant answers, which I discuss in more
detail in the later section. Using the data on gifts given and received in rural Tanzania, they
suggest that the network generated using the maximum report method only captures two-thirds
of the existing links. In this paper, I use the Comola and Fafchamps procedure and calculate
the probabilities of the “true” links existing between the MBA students. Since I have two
ways of measuring the social network (recall and recognition), I can compare the accuracy of
the network data collected via these two methods. The proportion of forgotten links for each
social network data collection method provides an additional measure by which I can compare
them.
3.3 Basic statistics of the survey responses
The data used in this research comes from the MBA program at a Canadian university.2 Each
year, the program admits approximately 100 students, and the class is divided into two sections.
Usually, the instructors teaching the sections are different, but the courses, curriculum and ma-
terial covered are the same. Students in each section are divided into learning teams: small
groups used for preparing for classes, group assignments and occasional in-class work. Learn-
ing teams switch three times in one year. Students are assigned to these teams based on their
observable characteristics: gender, previous degree, immigration status and admission GPA.
The strongest criterion is gender: teams have either two women or none. There is variation
across teams for other criteria. Most students starting the MBA program are not familiar with
each other: they come from different countries, universities and professional backgrounds. The
MBA program is time-intensive and is separated from other graduate programs (both in terms
of a campus location and general set up). Thus, students form new links and mainly with each
other when they enrol in the program.
I begin by summarizing the basic statistics of the survey responses. Over three years, 376
students were enrolled in the program and 276 completed the survey. One of the main issues
for collecting the social network data was obtaining the ethics board’s permission to include
students’ roster into the survey for the recognition question. Since I were not permitted to
include the full list of enrolled students to maintain their privacy, only the names of those who
2Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 describe the data in more detail
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gave their permission were listed. Out of 376 students, 284 gave their permission to include
their names on the list. Most of those were the students who agreed to fill out the survey.
However, some did not participate in the survey but allowed us to include their names. There
were also cases where students decided to participate in the survey at the last moment, and thus
their name was not included in the roster, but they filled out a survey. Table 3.1 summarizes
the basic statistics of the survey responses.
Table 3.1: Basic statistics of the respondents
2014 2015 2016
Total number of students enrolled 103 130 143
Number of students responded to the survey 78 98 100
Number of students included in the roster 80 97 107
Table 3.2 summarizes the number of peers named or picked for the two types of questions.
Note that in 2014 the roster of students for the recognition question only included students
from the same section (i.e. students in section 1 only had students from section 1 in their
recognition question roster), thus limiting respondents in the number of possible reported links.
The recognition question consisted of three parts and asked students to identify peers they
talked to, whom they go to for school-related advice, and those they socialize with. I include
the survey in the appendix. The recollection question asked students to name up to 7 friends.
For the recollection question, most students named seven friends, filling all the possible
slots. While it could indicate that perhaps students should have been asked to name more than
seven friends, I saw that survey respondents were making an effort to fill out all seven names
during classroom observations. Some continued with the survey and then came back to com-
plete the list. By construction, the recollection question results in a more sparse network and
a lower number of connections. However, the recollection question may result in respondents
mentioning the links that are “stronger” because students may be more likely to recall their
closer friends first. This could be useful, depending on the research question at hand.
The highest number of links was found for the “talk to” recognition question. This was
expected since this is the weakest of all conditions. If I look at the intersection of all three
recognition questions, I see that the number of peers mentioned across all three categories is
around 5-6. Given that those are likely to be students’ closest connections in the class (they
talk to, socialize with and go for the school advice to these people), it again supports the idea
that limiting the number of friends to 7 in the recall question is a reasonable assumption.
Students may differ in the way they answer the social network questions on the survey. To
see whether there are any apparent differences across different types of students, Tables 3.3-
3.5 summarize the number of peers picked for recollection and recognition questions based
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Table 3.2: Average number of peers picked
2014 2015 2016
Recollection 5.75 6.34 6.21
Recognition – Talk 26.30 45.07 40.54
Recognition – School Advice 7.62 8.80 10.67
Recognition – Socialize 13.72 27.57 21.20
Recognition – Talk, School and Socialize 4.86 5.82 5.58
on the students’ characteristics: gender, previous degree and immigration status. There are
no significant differences across the students’ responses. Some interesting stylized facts that
emerge are that commerce students seem to be less likely to go to someone for school-related
advice - which could be expected, given that they are probably most familiar with the program
as is. Domestic students may be connected to more peers (they talk to more students in general,
and they socialize more as well) than international students. Results vary somewhat from year
to year. Again, recall that in 2014 a lower number of students were available in the roster for
the recognition question.
Table 3.3: Number of indicated peers by respondent type - 2014
Women Men Commerce STEM Other CAN Imm
Recollection 6.94 6.80 6.60 6.79 7.00 6.85 6.78
Recognition – Talk 27.77 27.80 31.60 26.21 28.17 28.54 23.44
Recognition – School Advice 9.41 7.32 5.90 7.66 9.14 7.50 10.22
Recognition - Socialize 14.29 15.27 14.70 15.03 15.10 14.90 15.56
Recognition – Talk, School
and Socialize
6.59 5.05 4.60 5.07 6.41 5.33 6.33
Table 3.4: Number of indicated peers by respondent type - 2015
Women Men Commerce STEM Other CAN Imm
Recollection 6.42 6.29 6.42 6.09 6.92 6.50 6.20
Recognition – Talk 45.77 44.52 44.14 44.00 50.582 51.24 39.67
Recognition – School Advice 8.42 9.05 9.14 9.26 7.17 8.63 9.04
Recognition - Socialize 22.19 30.10 24.47 28.49 36.17 33.66 22.70
Recognition – Talk, School
and Socialize
5.27 6.10 6.69 5.43 4.67 6.74 5.11
3.4 Characteristics of picked peers
It is often hypothesized that people form links with those similar to them: in demographic char-
acteristics, background, interests, etc. Table 3.6-3.8 show the average proportions of friends of
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Table 3.5: Number of indicated peers by respondent type - 2016
Women Men Commerce STEM Other CAN Imm
Recollection 6.41 6.15 6.22 6.21 6.20 6.02 6.62
Recognition – Talk 38.91 41.07 38.95 40.32 45.07 40.41 40.83
Recognition – School Advice 9.64 11.00 8.95 10.68 14.87 10.67 10.66
Recognition - Socialize 20.23 21.51 20.89 17.68 30.87 23.67 16.00
Rec.– Talk, School and So-
cialize
4.45 5.94 4.46 5.26 9.13 6.57 3.48
different characteristics for each type of student to perform a basic check of this hypothesis.
The statistics are based on the recollection question, where I asked students to name up to 7
friends. Overall, it appears that students tend to be friends with peers of similar educational
backgrounds, gender and immigration status. For example, in 2014, on average, 50% of female
students’ friends were also female while only 22% of male students’ friends were female; 43%
of friends of students from Commerce/Economics background had the same type of degree;
and domestic students had mainly Canadian friends - 95% of the total number of friends.
Table 3.6: Avg. proportion of different friend types by respondent characteristics (based on
recollection question) 2014
Female friends Commerce degree
friends
STEM friends Canadian friends
Men 0.22 0.22 0.49 0.91
Women 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.86
Commerce 0.31 0.43 0.43 0.88
STEM 0.28 0.21 0.56 0.94
Other 0.32 0.13 0.36 0.84
Canadian 0.31 0.23 0.48 0.95
Int student 0.27 0.16 0.37 0.61
Table 3.7: Avg. proportion of different friend types by respondent characteristics (based on
recollection question) 2015
Female friends Commerce degree
friends
STEM friends Canadian friends
Men 0.18 0.40 0.33 0.44
Women 0.46 0.34 0.34 0.40
Commerce 0.27 0.36 0.29 0.47
STEM 0.27 0.36 0.40 0.38
Other 0.26 0.49 0.31 0.49
Canadian 0.28 0.44 0.29 0.61
Int student 0.26 0.33 0.37 0.28
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Table 3.8: Avg. proportion of different friend types by respondent characteristics (based on
recollection question) 2016
Female friends Commerce degree
friends
STEM friends Canadian friends
Men 0.14 0.39 0.35 0.68
Women 0.38 0.39 0.30 0.65
Commerce 0.21 0.43 0.26 0.69
STEM 0.19 0.34 0.42 0.59
Other 0.18 0.41 0.32 0.81
Canadian 0.21 0.43 0.31 0.76
Int student 0.18 0.31 0.40 0.47
3.5 Intersections of different peer types
Given my dataset, I can look at the intersections of various networks. Some of these networks
are established by students, and I can measure them via survey. However, the learning team
membership is defined by the administration, and since students are required to work with their
teams on projects, sit next to each other in class and are encouraged to study together, I have a
reason to believe that the students assigned to the same team are connected.
There are two ways that I can check the validity of the network that results from the recog-
nition question. First, learning team members are likely to talk to each other. Therefore,
conditional on teammates being a part of the roster, a student should indicate a connection with
them for at least the “talked to them” category. Second, since the recollection question asks
to name friends, students should also pick the same students from the list (conditional on their
name being included), at least for the “talked to” and/or “socialize with” questions.
The results show that most students do say that they talk to all or at least some of their
learning team peers. But, learning teammates are rarely named as friends. This is not very
surprising since it is likely that friendships form not simply “by proximity” but due to some
other factors and characteristics.
3.5.1 All peers
I first look at the intersection of different networks for all students. Specifically, I look at how
many of their learning team peers respondents also pick for the “talk to” question. Figure 3.1
shows the histogram of the results. I also see how many peers that the respondent named as
friends in a recollection question they talk to (according to the recognition question). Figure 3.2
shows the results of this intersection. Figures 3.3 through 3.7 show the intersections of various
networks. While there is a definite spike at 100% for the intersections between various network
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Figure 3.1: Fraction of Learning Team peers respondent also picked in “talk to” recognition
question
Figure 3.2: Fraction of peers respondent named in recollection question and picked in “talk to”
recognition question
questions in the survey – which I expected – there is still variation. Of particular interest are
values of zero – meaning that a student indicated the link for one type of network and not
another. However, I expect that if students socialize, they are probably talking to each other; if
they are friends, then they socialize or at least talk. Thus, the values of zero are potential errors
and require further investigation.
When it comes to asking for school-related advice, I think that this link does not necessarily
indicate friendship or socializing. People may ask each other for help in class and not often
talk outside of that interaction. Thus, I omit this type of network for the rest of the paper.
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Figure 3.3: Fraction of peers respondent named in recollection question who are also in his
Learning Team
Figure 3.4: Fraction of peers respondent named in recollection question and picked in “social-
ize with” recognition question
3.5.2 Symmetric links
Not all friends named in the recollection question may be equally close, and not all people
communicate with their friends with the same frequency and intensity. This section shows the
proportion of “forgotten” links when I limit the adjacency matrix for recollection question to
symmetric links only. Limiting the students’ friends to only those who named them as a friend
should provide us with stronger links and result in fewer errors.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 illustrate the results of this exercise. They show an improvement in the
quality of the responses, with the vast majority of students reporting talking or socializing with
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Figure 3.5: Fraction of peers respondent picked in “talk to” and “socialize with” recognition
questions
Figure 3.6: Intersection of recollection and all three recognition questions
the peers they named in the recollection question. However, discrepancies still exist.
3.5.3 Top three friends
Finally, most students filled out the recollection question with exactly seven names. It appears
that either the respondents interpreted the mention of number seven as a requirement or that
students have more than seven friends. Thus, asking them to name only seven was binding3.
3From observing the students during survey completion, it appears that the first option is likely correct. Stu-
dents filled out a few names and then took some time to remember more and complete the answer to the recollec-
tion question.
78 Chapter 3. Comparison of the TwoMethods of Social Network Data Collection
Figure 3.7: Intersection of recollection and two recognition questions (“talk to” and “socialize
with”)
Figure 3.8: Fraction of peers respondent named in recollection question and picked in “talk to”
recognition question (limited to symmetric links)
One option to strengthen the network is to limit the adjacency matrix for the recollection ques-
tion to the top 3 friends. In this case, the assumption is that students first remember the closest
peers, the ones they talk and socialize with most frequently.
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the proportion of peers that respondents named in the recol-
lection question and talk to or socialize with. Similar to the previous exercise, there is a clear
improvement in the results. Indeed, in 2014, a few students reported no intersections between
those they consider friends and those they talk to, but the rest of the respondents say that they
talk to all of their top three friends.
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Figure 3.9: Fraction of peers respondent named in recollection question and “socialize with”
recognition question (limited to symmetric links)
The observed misalignments are likely due to the reporting errors, and neither of the in-
tuitive ways eliminates them. The following section investigates the potential sources of the
errors and provides some potential ways of improving the results.
Figure 3.10: Fraction of peers respondent named in recollection question and picked in “talk
to” recognition question (limited to top 3 friends)
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Figure 3.11: Fraction of peers respondent named in recollection question and “socialize with”
recognition question (limited to top 3 friends)
3.6 Investigation of possible error sources
Even after limiting the adjacency matrices to include only the top-ranked or mutual connection
friends, some respondents “forget” to indicate the connections 4. Some of the possible reasons
behind the missing connections are careless survey completion, misunderstanding of the survey
instructions or random errors
The first type of error can potentially be uncovered and corrected by looking at students’
responses to other survey questions. To investigate the potential reasons for the missed connec-
tions, I performed the following exercise. I looked specifically at the intersection of students
named in the recollection question and those picked from the list for the “talk” question. I
assume that if a respondent considers someone to be a friend, they probably talk to each other
regularly. In particular, I focused on zeros: cases where none of the friends named in the recol-
lection question were picked from the list for the recognition question, even though they were
included in the roster.
Some of the potential indicators for the careless survey completion that I discovered are as
follows:
• Low number of friends named or picked from the list.
• Very low or very high estimated hours spent studying with the learning team or alone.
• Answers of “zero” for a few of the questions.
4It is unlikely that students omit names of friends on purpose – the survey is anonymous, and they do not gain
or lose anything from naming or not naming any given peer. Thus, I assume that there is no “strategic” reason for
forgetting a link.
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• Repetitive numbers, for example: “Study with the team: 3 hours”, “Study alone” 3 hours,
“Study with the team for all classes” 3 hours, “Study alone for all classes” 3 hours.
• In some cases, the number of hours studied for a previous degree seemed unusually low
(2-5 hours a week).
One thing to note is that in 2015 and 2016, the survey was longer than in 2014. First,
demographic questions were added to the survey and second, the roster included participants
from both sections as opposed to the respondent’s section only in 2014. The length of the
survey could have contributed to the high number of zeros in 2015 and 2016.
After looking at the answers, the best potential ways to prevent the errors are to exclude
respondents who name or pick a very low number of peers and carefully examine those who
tend to respond with the same number to the study hours questions. Those who write down an
unusually high or unusually low number of hours studied should also be considered potential
error sources. Limiting the length of the survey may provide more accurate results. Unfortu-
nately, due to the low sample size of these erroneous entries, I cannot conduct a more in-depth
analysis.
Another error source could be a misunderstanding of the question (either due to an honest
miscommunication or lack of attention and general carelessness). During the survey delivery
process, a few students asked whether they could pick the same person for all three of the
recognition questions’ columns. In this case, the researchers would answer the student’s ques-
tion and announce to the rest of the students that they can pick the same person in more than
one category. However, it is possible that some respondents did not pay attention to the an-
nouncement or left before the researchers made the announcement. So, another way to check
for errors is to see whether there is an intersection between the list of peers students picked in
part A of the recognition question (“pick peers you talked to”) and part C of the recognition
question (“pick peers you socialize with”). Part B’s answer was omitted because it asked for
peers the respondent goes to for school advice. Students do not need to socialize with peers
who help them with school, and they may not have regular communication with these peers
either. However, it is expected that if two students socialize outside of the classroom, they
probably are also talking to each other quite often. To make this assumption as conservative as
possible, I focus on the students who did not have any intersection between the responses to
these two parts of the question.
The results are quite interesting. In 2014, all four participants who did not indicate that
they talked to any of the peers they named as friends also had a zero intersection between
parts A and C of the recognition question. At the same time, they did pick names out of the
list for all three parts of the question. That is, while they picked names for each of the lists,
82 Chapter 3. Comparison of the TwoMethods of Social Network Data Collection
they seem to have avoided picking the same name for more than one column. Four out of 8
respondents in 2015 and 10 out of 13 in 2016 had zero intersection between named friends and
peers they talk to and peers they talk to and socialize with. It appears that limiting my analysis
to only students who have reasonable intersections between parts A and C of the recognition
question would eliminate most of the reporting errors. It seems that the errors occur partly due
to a misunderstanding of the instructions and partially due to carelessness. The tables in the
appendix (Tables 3.11-3.16) illustrate the error sources. It may be a reasonable assumption that
students who made this error are linked to all of the peers they indicated, but the true nature of
the link is now muddled (for example, if they picked someone with whom they socialize but
do not talk to, what does that mean?).
Overall, the comparison of the two survey data collection methods shows that the resulting
network from either of the questions may have flaws and errors. In the recollection question,
the limit of the potential responses may limit the size of the network. The recognition ques-
tions are prone to the “forgetting” the links issue. This is true even if I restrict my analysis to
only the top three named friends or only symmetric links. However, the inclusion of an addi-
tional recognition question may provide a checking tool. By looking at the intersection of the
responses, I may establish which students did not understand the question correctly or perhaps
were careless in the survey completion. Cross-validation using different questions aimed at the
same subject is a common way of checking the survey results in psychology. Adding just one
more field for the recognition question may provide such a validation mechanism and should
not be too costly in terms of the time spent on the survey. Ensuring the participants understand
the instructions is also important.
The survey for this study has been done on paper, and it was difficult to customize to a
particular respondent. However, in many other situations, an online format may be used. In this
case, it may be possible to create checks by giving additional questions to some fraction of the
respondents. This check may be implemented randomly or based on the provided answers to
the earlier questions. In the discussion above, I mentioned some potential indicators of careless
survey completion or errors, mainly based on the survey’s other responses. In the section
below, I discuss discordant answers and estimate the probability of forgetting an existing link
depending on personal characteristics. This probability also may help us “flag” respondents
who are more likely to make mistakes or more likely to forget the links, and thus should be
subject to additional questions.
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3.7 Discordant responses analysis
One of the common assumptions in social network data collection is that if one of the re-
spondents reported a link, but the other did not, then a link exists - i.e. the assumption of
underreporting.5 Under this assumption, if person j reported the link, but the person i did not,
that means that person i forgot about (or chose not to report) this connection. Then, by looking
at the connections where a person i has reported the link ij and the ones where person i did
not report the link ij, but person j did, I can estimate the probability of person i forgot the link
conditional on his or her characteristics. I can also estimate the probability of the true link
existing between any i and j. I estimate these probabilities using the method used in Comola
and Fafchamps (2017). The probability of forgetting the links could serve as one of the metrics
by which I can compare the two social network data collection methods. Depending on the in-
tended purpose of using the network data, a researcher can then decide which approach results
in the network that would be more aligned with the research question requirements.
3.7.1 Estimation
To estimate the effect of the discordant links on the reported social network, I use the method
described by Comola and Fafchamps (2017). Suppose that the true link between students is
given by τi j. My objective then is to estimate the following regression:
Pr(τi j = 1) = λ(βτXi j) (3.1)
Where Xi j is the vector of joint characteristics of students i and j and λ is the logit function.
Suppose that the reports of the links are represented by the adjacency matrix R, where Ri ji is a
report of person i of the link i j, and Ri jj is the report of person j of the same link. For readability,
I will denote these as Ri and R j. In theory, if τi j = 1, I should observe Ri = R j = 1. However,
in reality, the reports of the links often do not match, and discordant answers are common. The
data generation process then is:
5The overreporting assumption is less common but could be applicable in certain situations. Under the over-
reporting assumption, I assume that a link does not exist unless both respondents report it.
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Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1,Ri = 1,R j = 1) + Pr(τ = 0,Ri = 1,R j = 1)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|Ri = 1, τ = 1)
+Pr(τ = 0) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 0) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|Ri = 1, τ = 0)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1,Ri = 0,R j = 1) + Pr(τ = 0,Ri = 0,R j = 1)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 0|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|Ri = 0, τ = 1)
+Pr(τ = 0) ∗ Pr(Ri = 0|τ = 0) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|Ri = 0, τ = 0)
Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 0) = Pr(τ = 1,Ri = 1,R j = 0) + Pr(τ = 0,Ri = 1,R j = 0)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 0|Ri = 1, τ = 1)
+Pr(τ = 0) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 0) ∗ Pr(R j = 0|Ri = 1, τ = 0)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 0) = 1 − Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 1) − Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 1) − Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 0)
The above system of four equations has seven unknowns. Thus, to perform the estimations,
I make the following simplifying assumptions.
Assumption 1: under-reporting. For simplicity I assume that the students report only
the links that are truly there. I.e. Pr(R = 1|τ = 0) = 0. Depending on the context of the
social network this assumption may be more or less reasonable. For the network of students
who explicitly named their friends (recollection question in the survey), this assumption is
likely true. It is likely that students only write down the names of those students who they are
indeed connected to. On the other hand, the assumption of under-reporting may be stronger
for the recognition question. It is possible that students erroneously check the boxes across the
names of the students they do not really talk to or socialize with.6 Under the under-reporting
assumption it is possible that the respondents report no link while the link is truly there. I now
re-write the data generating process as follows:
6I am working on exploring the implications of modifying this assumption to assume some probability of a
mistake, i.e. a probability that a respondent erroneously indicated someone as a friend even though they are not.
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Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1,Ri = 1,R j = 1)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|Ri = 1, τ = 1)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1,Ri = 0,R j = 1)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 0|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|Ri = 0, τ = 1)
Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 0) = Pr(τ = 1,Ri = 1,R j = 0)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 0|Ri = 1, τ = 1)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 0) = 1 − Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|Ri = 1, τ = 1)
− Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 0|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|Ri = 0, τ = 1)
− Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 0|Ri = 1, τ = 1)
Assumption 2: Reports made by person i and person j are independent of each other. Co-
mola and Fafchamps (2017) in their paper formally show why imposing assumptions about the
correlation between reports is necessary. In short, without imposing this type of assumption,
the system of equations above is not identified. While it is possible to assume some correlation
across the responses, I believe that the assumption of independence is most reasonable in the
case of MBA data used in this paper and makes for the easiest estimation. First, there is no
reason or possibility for students to collude in their answers to the survey question. That is,
if person i named person j as a friend, it should not affect the probability of person j to name
person i as a friend. In addition, students were supervised while completing their surveys and
thus they would not be able to know who named them as a friend. Thus, I can rewrite the above
system of equations as follows:
Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 0|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)
Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 0) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 0|τ = 1)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 0) = 1 − Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)
− Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 0|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)
− Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 0|τ = 1)
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I can represent the above system of equations in terms of three unknown probabilities,
Pr(τ = 1), Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) and Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1):
Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1) (3.2)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ (1 − Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1)) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1) (3.3)
Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 0) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ (1 − Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)) (3.4)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 0) = 1 − Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)
− Pr(τ = 1) ∗ (1 − Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1)) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)
− Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ (1 − Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1))
(3.5)
I assume that the probabilities Pr(τ = 1), Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) and Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1) can be
represented as the logit functions of the following forms:
Pr(τ = 1) = λ(βτXi j) (3.6)
Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) = λ(βXi) (3.7)
Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1) = λ(βX j) (3.8)
In contrast with the data used by Comola and Fafchamps (givers and receivers of transfers
in rural Tanzania), the students in the MBA social network data do not have distinct roles.
I.e. students i and j are equivalent conditional on their characteristics and none of them have
strategic or other reasons to report or withhold information on certain links. Thus, I expect the
coefficients β from the estimation of Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) and Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1) to be equivalent. I
also assume that the existence of a true link depends on the joint characteristics of the students.
In contrast, reporting a link conditional on the link existing depends on the respondent’s char-
acteristics. Student j’s characteristics do not affect the probability of student i reporting a link,
conditional on the link truly being there.
Together, equations (3.2) -(3.8) describe the likelihood function. The results of the MLE
estimation are presented below in Table 3.9. The reports of the links may be correlated on the
respondent level. Thus, the standard errors are adjusted (clustered two ways) using the method
by Cameron and Miller (2015).
The results support previous findings that students tend to form links with similar peers.
Indeed, students of the same gender, domestic students and international students are more
likely to have a connection. For the recognition question, having a similar, high admission
GPA (>73%) predicts the existence of a true link. Interestingly, students who score high on
extraversion characteristic form links with other extraverts. Students with “other” degrees (
social science, humanities, arts) tend to talk and socialize with each other, but they do not
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Table 3.9: Results of MLE estimation. Estimated probability of a true link existing and esti-
mated probability of reporting a link conditional on the true link existing
Recollection Question Recognition (talk to) Recognition (socialize)






Pr(τ = 1) Pr(R =
1|τ = 1)
Both same sex 0.633*** 0.442*** 0.511***
(0.086) (0.097) (0.08)
Both STEM -0.0424 -0.0710 0.0220
(0.067) (0.141) (0.124)
Both Commerce -0.0447 0.0372 -0.145
(0.088) (0.157) (0.134)
Both other degrees 0.0434 0.437* 0.474***
(0.103) (0.292) (0.210)
Both domestic students 0.512*** 0.804*** 1.010***
(0.108) (0.170) (0.143)
Both international students 0.447*** 0.257** 0.273**
(0.120) (0.142) (0.153)
Both extraverts 0.227*** 0.831*** 0.437***
(0.072) (0.172) (0.144)
Both have high GPA 0.0584 0.700*** 0.353***
(0.024) (0.21) (0.153)
Both have low GPA 0.171 0.129 0.0883
(0.214) (0.335) (0.209)
Female 0.0926 0.0932 0.0714
(0.1963) (0.11) (0.127)
Commerce degree 0.293* -0.001 0.258**
(0.203) (0.105) (0.139)
STEM -0.185 -0.0783 -0.0433
(0.168) (0.114) (0.144)
Domestic student 0.275* 0.106 0.132
(0.171) (0.114) (0.138)
Adm. GPA 0.0146* -0.00120 -0.00158
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
Constant -2.668*** -1.195* 1.087*** 1.203*** -0.694*** 0.417
(0.129) (0.907) (0.240) (0.472) (0.191) (0.595)
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 16,296 16,296 14,438 14,438 14,438 14,438
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered two-ways on the respondent level
Data source: survey data 2014-2016.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
necessarily form friendships. When it comes to the probability of reporting a link, students
with commerce degrees and domestic students tend to report links more accurately, and they
are less likely to forget the existing links. Students with high admission GPA are more likely to
report links accurately in the recollection question but do as well as others on the recognition
question. Using the results from Table 3.9, I calculated the estimated proportion of true links
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for each network. I then compare it to the measure of links under the underreporting assumption
(taking the maximum of the reports of Ri and R j). The results are in Table 3.10. The results
show that the maximum report’s network only captures around 70% of the true links. This is
in line with Comola and Fafchamps (2017) findings, who find that only about two-thirds of all
links are reported in their data. The recognition question, which asked students to identify who
they talk to, performed the best, capturing about 79% of the links (under the maximum report
rule). The recollection question performed the worst under this metric, reflecting only 64% of
the links.







Predicted links (MLE) 0.22 0.91 0.69
Maximum report 0.14 0.72 0.47
3.7.2 Reporting probabilities
The second part of the estimation shows how the probability of reporting (or forgetting) links
varies with the characteristics. The results are not quite the same across different network
measures, yet there are similarities. For example, domestic students seem to report links more
reliably in all cases. Students with commerce degree backgrounds are more likely to report
links in the recollection question and the recognition question asking about socializing. Fe-
male students appear to have significantly more accurate responses to the recognition question
about talking to their peers. However, there is a positive (albeit not statistically significant)
relationship between gender (female) and reporting probabilities for all questions. Finally,
students with higher admission GPA scores provide more accurate responses to the recollec-
tion question, but GPA does not matter for the recognition question. The histograms of the
estimated probabilities of reporting a link (conditional on a true link existing) are presented
below.
There could be several potential implications for these findings for both the analysis of the
data and the methods of survey data collection. First, if I know who is more likely to provide
an accurate response to the questions, I may be able to assign a higher weight to their answers
when constructing an adjacency matrix. For example, I can make an assumption that all links
reported by certain types of students are correct, while the links reported by other students have
a probability of being erroneous. Depending on the intended use of the data, this may help us
determine a more accurate network structure and/or make better assumptions.
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Figure 3.12: Predicted probability of reporting a link (conditional on true link existing) - Rec-
ollection
Figure 3.13: Predicted probability of reporting a link (conditional on true link existing) -
Recognition (Talk)
Second, there are possible improvements in how I collect the survey network data if I
can identify the types of respondents who are likely to make mistakes. These respondents
may be asked to answer the network question again, or asked to check their answers or asked
clarifying questions about the nature of their relationship with those whom they indicated as
friends. For example, if a person is identified as someone with a higher probability of making
errors, she may be asked “Who are your five friends?”, and then as a follow-up question: “How
many times a week/month do you speak to [Friend 1]”. This will allow the respondent (or the
researchers) to catch the potential mistakes either during the survey completion or analysis.
90 Chapter 3. Comparison of the TwoMethods of Social Network Data Collection
Figure 3.14: Predicted probability of reporting a link (conditional on true link existing) -
Recognition (Socialize)
3.8 Conclusion
This paper provides some descriptive statistics of the MBA students’ network and gives a few
critical considerations for the choices of the social network collection questions in a survey,
and gives some direction for dealing with misreported links and discordant answers.
By applying Comola and Fafchamps (2017) method to discordant links, I show that the
recollection question fails to capture approximately half of the true network. The recognition
questions do somewhat better by missing only 30-40% of the true links. However, recognition
questions may be more prone to errors due to the respondents’ carelessness and misunder-
standing of the task. I suggest some ways of recognizing potential error sources, one of which
involves using two recognition questions that are likely to result in overlapping networks (for
example, people who also socialize likely talk to each other). The recollection question is also
likely to capture stronger links, although it depends on the question’s wording. Depending on
the network’s intended use, a researcher may choose the appropriate way of collecting social
network data.
My estimations also show the type of students who are less likely to forget to report the
links. It would be interesting to see if these findings hold in other social network datasets.
Suppose I can predict the type of respondent who is likely to give correct answers. In that case,




3.9.1 Additional tables - Descriptive results
Table 3.11: 2014 - survey answers summary - no intersection between named friends and peers
student talks to
IDs 25 51 53 79
# of friends named 6 7 7 7
# of friends talks to 7 26 25 4
# of questions answered with non-zero 8 8 8 6
# of hours studying alone - finance 10 3 3 5
# of hours studying with LT - finance 6 1 3 0
# of hours studying alone - total 60 15 15 20
# of hours studying with LT - total 12 5 15 8
Table 3.12: 2015 - survey answers summary - no intersection between named friends and peers
student talks to
ID 10 36 43 57 72 82 94 98
# of friends named 7 7 7 5 7 7 5 7
# of friends talks to 13 50 39 32 48 22 32 29
# of questions answered with non-zero 10 5 10 9 10 9 10 10
# of hours spent studying alone - finance 2 0 10 6 3 4 5 6
# of hours spent studying with LT - finance 2 1 5 1 4 2 2 6
# of hours spent studying alone - total 35 0 55 24 10 12 20 20
# of hours studying with LT - total 6 3 10 5 5 4 5 8
Table 3.13: 2016 - survey answers summary - no intersection between named friends and peers
student talks to
ID 2 14 18 24 36 43 49 61 63 66 99 101 107
# of friends named 7 7 2 4 7 7 7 7 6 5 6 7 6
# of friends talks to 16 27 36 11 67 76 38 4 14 9 28 41 0
# of questions answered with non-zero 10 9 7 10 8 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10
# of hours spent studying alone - finance 4 5 4 6 8.5 3 8 3 10 10 2 10 12
# of hours spent studying with LT - finance 1 2 0 1 0 3 5 8 15 0.5 2 2 6
# of hours spent studying alone - total 16 20 4 20 65 38 12 25 10 30 8 20 30
# of hours studying with LT - total 4 5 0 10 2.5 7 12 20 10 5 8 10 10
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Table 3.14: Intersection of Parts A and C (Talk and Socialize) of the recognition question -
2014
IDs 16 25 51 53 62 74 79
Number of peers named in A 27 7 26 25 14 12 4
Number of peers named in C 6 5 7 8 19 10 6
Number of peers named in B 0 7 2 8 2 3 4
Table 3.15: Intersection of Parts A and C (Talk and Socialize) of the recognition question -
2015
IDs 1 10 19 57 72 82 84
Number of peers named in A 0 13 21 32 48 22 25
Number of peers named in C 0 0 10 17 26 53 1
Number of peers named in B 0 3 5 5 4 21 4
Table 3.16: Intersection of Parts A and C (Talk and Socialize) of the recognition question -
2016
IDs 2 4 13 14 24 38 43 49 53 61 66 80 99 101
Number of peers named in A 16 30 8 27 11 35 76 38 26 4 9 23 28 41
Number of peers named in C 22 10 1 30 36 16 16 32 2 22 10 9 23 32
Number of peers named in B 12 27 0 6 10 0 15 5 5 2 5 0 0 4
3.9.2 Relaxing the assumption of no overreporting
The assumption of underreporting is most reasonable for the recollection question. Indeed, it
is highly unlikely that a respondent puts down the name of a peer they are not connected to.
However, in the case of recognition questions, a mistake can easily be made when a respondent
checks off a name on the roster by mistake or carelessness. Thus, I test the sensitivity of the
results to relaxing the assumption of underreporting. I consider three cases: the probability
of reporting a link that is not there is 10%, 5% and 20%, to see how it affects the resulting
estimated network size for roster questions. I maintain the independence assumption for this
exercise.
I rewrite the equations (2)-(5) in the following manner:
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Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)
+ (1 − Pr(τ = 1)) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 0) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 0)
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ (1 − Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1)) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1)
+ (1 − Pr(τ = 1)) ∗ (1 − Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 0)) ∗ Pr(R j = 1|τ = 0)
Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 0) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 1) ∗ (1 − Pr(R j = 1|τ = 1))
+ (1 − Pr(τ = 1)) ∗ Pr(Ri = 1|τ = 0) ∗ (1 − Pr(R j = 1|τ = 0))
Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 0) = 1 − Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 1) − Pr(Ri = 0,R j = 1) − Pr(Ri = 1,R j = 0)
I assume the values of 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 for Pr(R = 1|τ = 0), and see how these assumptions
affect the estimations. The resulting network sizes are presented in the table below.
Table 3.17: Results of relaxing the underreporting assumption
Recognition question - Talk
Probability of an error 0% 5% 10% 20%
Estimated network 0.91 0.9 0.88 0.83
Max Report 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Recognition question - Socialize
Probability of an error 0% 5% 10% 20%
Estimated network 0.69 0.64 0.58 0.53
Max Report 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
The results show that the estimated network size is somewhat responsive to the assumptions
on the probability of erroneously picking a non-connection as a connection. The “socialize”
recognition question seems to be somewhat more sensitive. However, even at a 20% probability
of making a mistake, the size of the estimated network is larger than the maximum report. Thus,
for the maximum report network to be accurate, I need to assume that students mistakenly pick
peers out of the list with a higher than a 20% probability. It appears that in the absence of
a strategic reason for students to pick connections that are not truly there, this error rate is
unreasonably high. However, this exercise provides us with a range of possible network sizes
under some reasonable assumptions of the error rate.
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Study ID_____   







Gender (circle)   M      F 
 
GMAT score ____________ 
 
What was the average percentage GPA score from your previous undergraduate degree?  ___________% 
 
What is the major of your undergraduate degree? ________________________________________ 
 
How much work experience do you have? ____ years ____months 
 
What industry do you have work experience in? __________________________________________ 
 
Where you born in Canada? Yes  No   
 
If not, how many years ago did you arrive in Canada?_____ 
 
What is your mother tongue_____________________ 
 


















Q2  Even though you do not know for sure, you may have certain beliefs about your performance in the 
Managerial Finance course. In your opinion, what is the probability that your grade in the Finance course 
will be (recall that the sum of the probabilities should be 100%): 
 




Study ID_____   







Q3 How many hours a week (approximately) do you spend studying for the Managerial Finance course 
(outside of class time)? 
By myself _____hours       With my Module 1 Learning Team _____hours 
 
Q4 How many hours a week (approximately) do you spend studying for the Leading People and 
Organizations course (outside of class time)? 
By myself _____hours       With my Module 1 Learning Team _____hours 
  
Q5 How many hours a week (approximately) do you spend studying for all your courses (outside of class 
time)? 
By myself _____ hours     With my Module 1 Learning Team _____hours 
 
Q6 Finish the sentence by picking one or more options (if you pick more than one, please rank them in 
order of frequency, 1 being “most often” ): 
“During the meeting with my Learning Team, most often I: 
___ Explain concepts to other students 
___ Lead the discussion of the case 
___ Use my work experience to illustrate the concepts covered in class or mentioned in the case 
___ Play “devil’s advocate” by arguing various case points with my colleagues 
___ Prefer to listen to my team members rather than actively participate in the discussion 
___ Ask my teammates to explain to me concepts covered in class.” 
 
Q7 How many hours a week (approximately) did you spend studying while completing your previous 
degree (outside of class time)? 
______hours a week 
 
Q8 How many hours a week (approximately) do you spend socializing with your peers from the MBA 
program (go to bars, restaurants, concerts, events, playing sports, etc.)? 
______hours a week 
 
Q9 How satisfied are you with your Learning Team (Module 1)? Please circle the appropriate answer: 
Very Unsatisfied Unsatisfied Neither satisfied or unsatisfied  Satisfied Very 
Satisfied  
 






Q11 Here is a number of traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number next to each 
statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  











______ Extraverted, enthusiastic 
______ Critical, inflexible 
______ Dependable, self-disciplined 
______ Anxious, easily upset 
______ Open to new experiences, imaginative 
______ Reserved, quiet 
______ Sympathetic, warm 
______ Disorganized, careless 
______ Calm, emotionally stable 




Q12  For each of the students on the following list, please indicate by circling the number in the 
appropriate cell whether or not: 
• You have had a conversation with him/her within the last 2 weeks. By conversation I mean an 
interaction with some content. (e.g. simply greeting someone does not count as a conversation). 
• You ever go to him/her for schoolwork related advice (e.g. questions about concepts covered in 
class, help with assignments or preparation for exams) 
• You socialize with him/her outside of the school (e.g. attend parties together, go to bars, 
concerts, events, play sports etc.) 
 
Had a conversation 
within the last 2 
weeks 




Names (Section 1) 
1 1 1 Name 
2 2 2 Name 
… … … … 
N N N Name 
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